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St. Thomas Aquinas speaks to the heart of what it means to 
be human in our relationship with God when he expounds the 
way of the moral life in his Summa Theologiae.1  A classic 
example of the depth of his understanding is evident in his 
treatment of acts that knowingly kill.  His style of writing is 
succinct and sometimes his ideas are distributed among several 
texts, but one can mine the riches of his thought with patient 
reading and reflection.  This Article focuses exclusively on the 
extreme case where a person is certain to die if nothing is done 
and the only way to save that person is by one’s act while 
knowing that it must result in the certain killing of another 
person.  Most scholars using some version of the doctrine of 
double effect interpret Aquinas to permit such an act when it 
repulses the attack of an aggressor on someone’s life.  This 
Article rejects this conclusion as well as its justification in the 
doctrine of double effect and proposes a rule that more accurately 
reflects the texts of Aquinas as he distinguishes prohibited acts 
from permitted acts.  Specifically, it argues that his rule is that, 
when a person (whether oneself or another) is certain to die if 
nothing is done and the only way to save that person is by one’s 
act (as a private individual and not one acting under public 
authority) knowing that it must result in the certain killing of 
some other person (whether or not an aggressor), the act is 
prohibited unless one retains or removes a vital life support from 
the person killed2 that belongs to the person saved (whether 
 
† Professor of Law and former Dean, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., 
Harvard College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; S.J.D., Harvard Law 
School; M.A., St. Vincent de Paul Regional Seminary; M.Phil., Catholic University of 
America; Ph.D., Catholic University of America. 
1 See generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (1st ed. Benziger 
Brothers 1947) (1266–1273) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE]. 
2 A vital life support consists of such things as food and water to sustain the 
body against hunger and thirst, air to sustain the body against suffocation, material 
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oneself or another), or unless one ducks, blocks or redirects a 
deadly force away from the person saved (whether oneself or 
another who is under one’s charge).  If the act does not fit within 
one of the two exceptions, then it is an attack on the vital life 
support of the person killed and is a prohibited killing.  The first 
Part explains how and why Aquinas constructs this prohibitory 
rule and its exceptions.  The second Part adds further clarity by 
applying the rule to several controversial modern-day cases. 
I. THE DEFINITION OF A PROHIBITED KILLING 
Among the texts of Aquinas there are six key statements 
which expound the core of his doctrine on killing.  Three of them 
prohibit killing.  Aquinas states that “it is altogether unlawful to 
kill oneself,”3 “it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent,”4 and “it 
is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, 
except for such as have public authority.”5  Three of them provide 
a counter.  Despite the unlawfulness of killing oneself, Aquinas 
states that “[i]t is clear that the sign of the greatest love is to lay 
down one’s life for one’s friends.”6  Despite the unlawfulness of 
killing the innocent, he states that 
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and 
had merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or 
others under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and 
that of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then 
necessary to him.7   
Finally, despite the unlawfulness of intentionally killing a man 
in self-defense, he states that “it [is not] necessary for salvation 
that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid 





support to sustain the body against a fall or drowning, and even one’s own body 
itself. 
3 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469. 
4 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. 
5 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
6 THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, Chapters 9–21 
(The Aquinas Institute ed., Fabian Larcher trans.), in 36 BIBLICAL COMMENTARIES 
290 (C. 15, L. 2) (2013), commenting on John 15:13: “Greater love than this no man 
has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” 
7 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. 
8 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
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develop an understanding of Aquinas’s prohibition against killing 
by one acting as a private individual9 even though that one 
knows it is the only way to save oneself or another person. 
A. Prohibition 
Aquinas’s prohibition against killing by a private individual 
is based on our understanding that God retains authority over 
the life and death of a human person:  “[L]ife is God’s gift to man, 
and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. . . . For 
it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, 
according to Deut. 32:39, I will kill and I will make to live.”10  
God gives mankind the power of life and death over plants and 
animals,11 but He does not give mankind dominion over death:  
“Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore 
he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which 
pertain to this life which is ruled by man’s free-will,” says 
Aquinas, “[b]ut the passage from this life to another and happier 
one is subject not to man’s free-will but to the power of God.”12 
 
9 This Article does not examine acts by an individual acting under public 
authority. Aquinas permits killing for the common good by a person acting under 
public authority because “the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of 
rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can 
lawfully put evildoers to death.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1467. For example, a 
judge acts on the authority of the community when he sentences a man to death. Id. 
pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, ad. 3, at 1470. Aquinas states in his COMMENTARY ON THE 
GOSPEL OF MATTHEW, CHAPTERS 1–12 (Jeremy Holmes and Beth Mortensen trans.), 
in 33 BIBLICAL COMMENTARIES 161 (C. 5, L. 7.483) (2013), that “it is permitted to 
those who kill by the command of God, for God is the one who does it. But every law 
is a command from God: by me kings reign (Prov 8:15); he does not bear the sword in 
vain for his is God’s minister (Rom 13:4).” Therefore, it is permitted for secular 
judges to sentence people according to the laws (“iudices seculares qui condemnant 
secundum leges”) but not for one to kill on one’s own authority (“auctoritate 
propria”).  The reason for permitting those with public authority to kill and 
prohibiting those with no such authority may reside in the parable of the wheat and 
the tares in Matthew 13:24–30. Aquinas uses this parable to show that the Lord 
justifies the killing of sinners, but not if they cannot be distinguished from the 
innocent.  Aquinas states that “Our Lord commanded them to forbear from 
uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. . . . [W]hen the wicked 
cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,” but when “the good incur 
no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the 
latter may be lawfully put to death.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 
64, art. 2, ad. 1, at 1467. The rule that only those with public authority can kill the 
sinner minimizes the chances that an innocent person will be killed by requiring an 
official determination before someone is determined to be a sinner. 
10 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469. 
11 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1 & ad. 1, at 1466. 
12 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469. 
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The reason that God retains authority over the life and 
death of human persons is that they are “made to God’s image, in 
so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with 
free-will and self-movement,”13 which enables them to become 
sons of God through the work of the Holy Spirit.14  Aquinas states 
that “filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, 
since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but 
by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer 
we approach to the true idea of filiation.”15  Human persons as 
rational creatures have a more perfect likeness to God than 
irrational creatures because they have “the likeness of His 
image,” whereas irrational creatures have filiation “by reason 
only of a trace.”16  The difference is crucial because “[t]he likeness 
by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, 
whereas the likeness of image does.”17  Aquinas states that “the 
life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for 
man,”18 and therefore “it is lawful both to take life from plants for 
the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men.”19  The 
rational creature, on the other hand, is “competent, properly 
speaking, to possess good” and thus capable of the fellowship of 
friendship in charity which can attain everlasting happiness.20  
 
13 Id. pt. I-II, prologue, at 583 (quoting JOHN DAMASCENE, DE FIDE ORTHODOXA 
2.12). The Catholic Church confirms that “[e]very human life, from the moment of 
conception until death, is sacred because the human person has been willed for its 
own sake in the image and likeness of the living and holy God.” CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2319 (2d ed., 1997). 
14 Aquinas states that “in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which 
man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed 
by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in 
addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 14, 17: 
Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs 
also.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 68, art. 2, at 879. 
15 Id. pt. I, Q. 33, art. 3, at 175. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1282. 
18 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1460. 
19 Id. Aquinas explains that “[d]umb animals and plants are devoid of the life of 
reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, 
by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and 
accommodated to the uses of others.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1, ad. 2, at 1460. “Man 
owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, 
indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 103, art. 4, 
ad. 3, at 1634. 
20 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 3, at 1282. See also John Haldane & Patrick Lee, 
Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life, 78 PHIL. 255, 276–
78 (2003) (showing that Pope John Paul II and Aquinas are of one mind on the 
sacred reality of human life). 
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Therefore, “it is unlawful to kill any man [nullum occidere licet], 
since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the 
nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying 
him.”21 
The prohibition against killing applies to killing any person.  
Charitable love of one’s neighbor is love of all mankind, including 
sinners and enemies.22  Neighbor means one who is “nigh to us,” 
namely, “as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity 
for glory,” and one “should love his neighbor for God’s sake, even 
as he loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his 
neighbor is a holy love.”23  Humankind constitutes the body of the 
Church with Christ as the head and the Holy Spirit as the 
heart,24 and no person may destroy any part of this body because 
no person has a nature distinct from any other person.25  In the 
Sermon on the Mount, Christ elaborated on the nature of 
charitable love, the love that undergirds the commandment not 
to kill:  Not only should one not kill, but one should not have 
animosity towards another,26 one should answer an injustice with 
kindness and not with retaliation,27 and one should love one’s 
enemies and pray for those who persecute one.28  The virtue of 
charitable love lies in loving God so much that, as Aquinas 
explains, one loves all that is connected with Him, including one’s 
enemies.29   This virtue must certainly have been what Aquinas 
 
21 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. It is true 
that an individual man may be considered in relation to the community and 
therefore, “the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, 
which is corrupted by sin.” Id. However, “the care of the common good is entrusted to 
persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private 
individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1467. 
22 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 11, art. 4, at 1227. 
23 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 44, art. 7, at 1378. 
24 Id. pt. III, Q. 8, art. 1, at 2076; pt. III, Q. 8, art. 3, at 2077; and pt. III, Q. 8, 
art. 1, ad. 3, at 2076. 
25 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1468 (“[A] man who has sinned is not by 
nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to 
condemn him to death for the common good.”). 
26 Matthew 5:21–24 (New American). 
27 Id. 5:38–42. 
28 Id. 5:43–45. 
29 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 1, ad. 2, at 1269–70 
(“Friendship extends . . . to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has 
friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they 
children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our 
friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate 
us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom 
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had in mind when he stated that “it is not lawful for a man [in 
his private capacity] to intend killing a man in self-
defense . . . .”30 
Therefore, in accord with this interpretation of Aquinas, one 
must overcome the inclination to attack the vital life support of 
an aggressor who is about to take one’s life because one’s love of 
God is at stake.  The image of God resides in the aggressor and it 
is not merely that we destroy another human being but that we 
destroy God’s image within him.31  In doing so, we offend God 
whom we love more than anyone else in this world including 
ourselves.32  We must not destroy the nature that God has 
created in His own image, even if it means our own death or the 
death of our loved ones.  This is difficult without the help of God, 
but we can expand our vision to see others through Christ’s eyes 
by accepting God’s gift of charity through which we can come to 
treat all people as gifts of God under his sovereignty.33 
 
 
we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly 
directed.”). 
30 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. Note that the sed contra in this Article 
suggests that Aquinas would allow the intentional killing of a man in self-defense, 
because Exodus 22:2 allows the killing of a thief who breaks into one’s house. 
However, the sed contra does not represent Aquinas’s thought but merely an 
argument contrary to the objections. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, sed contra, at 1471. 
31 Aquinas states that “it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, 
and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out 
of charity, for God’s sake.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 6, at 1290. We love our neighbor 
“that he may be in God. . . . [And thus,] it is specifically the same act whereby we 
love God, and whereby we love our neighbor.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 1, at 1286.  The 
actual love of one’s “enemy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for [one] to do 
so, belongs to the perfection of charity.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 8, at 1292. 
32 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 3, at 1296 (“[T]he fellowship of natural goods bestowed 
on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which . . . man, so long as 
his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than 
himself . . . .”). 
33 Aquinas states that “charity itself surpasses our natural faculties,” and is in 
us “by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and 
the participation of Whom in us is created charity . . . .” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 2, at 
1276. It can increase in intensity by this infusion when one strives to dispose oneself 
to receiving it through acts of charity. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 6, at 1279–80.  Charity 
can be perfected in this life to the extent that a person “makes an earnest endeavor 
to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so 
far as the needs of the present life demand.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 8, at 1281. This 
perfection is reached by first avoiding sin and resisting one’s concupiscences, then by 
pursuing progress in the good so as to strengthen one’s charity, and then by aiming 
chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God, which “belongs to the perfect who desire 
to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 9, at 1282. 
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The order of charitable love described by Aquinas does not 
detract from this prohibition on killing.  One loves God more 
than oneself because He is the greatest good to Whom one is 
naturally drawn by one’s own nature and even more by “the 
friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts 
of grace.”34  Next, one loves oneself more than any other person 
“by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves 
his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good.”35  However, 
this love of oneself more than neighbor does not allow one to kill 
one’s neighbor to save oneself because it is in bearing bodily 
injury for one’s friend’s sake that one loves oneself by sharing in 
the Divine good.36  Bodily injury includes one’s own death when 
one is faced with the choice of suffering death or acting 
immorally by killing another.  Aquinas affirms this when he says 
that one should defend oneself even at the risk of another’s life, 
but “it is not lawful for a man [in his private capacity] to intend 
killing a man in self-defense.”37  In other words, one must not 
attack the vital life support of another person if it is certain to 
kill him, even when it is the only way to save oneself from an 
aggressor.  To kill one’s neighbor is to destroy the fellowship that 
gives one a share of the Divine good and, by this destruction, to 
reject the charitable love of God.  We love ourselves more by 
suffering death than by rejecting God’s love. 
Contrary to this interpretation, a number of scholars have 
maintained that Aquinas does not prohibit killing if the 
alternative is one’s own death at the hands of an aggressor.38  In 
recent times many of these scholars have claimed that Aquinas 
permits such killing by what is now popularly known as the 
doctrine of double effect.  The doctrine purports to derive from 
Aquinas’s statement that “the act of self-defense may have two 
effects, one is the saving of one’s life [intended], the other is the 
slaying of the aggressor [beside the intention]. . . . [So that] this 
act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not 
unlawful.”39  Joseph Boyle, who is a strong proponent of the 
doctrine, maintains that what Aquinas means by “intended” in 
 
34 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 3, at 1297. 
35 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 4, at 1297. 
36 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 4 & ad. 2, at 1297. 
37 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
38 For a summary of the positions of several of these commentators, see 
generally Jose Rojas, St. Thomas’ Treatise on Self-Defense Revisited, in THOMISTICA 
89, 89–95 (E. Manning ed., 1995). 
39 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
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this passage is what is sought and what he means by “beside the 
intention” is what is not sought even though it is foreseen.40  So, 
in an intended killing, which is prohibited, the foreseen natural 
consequences are “chosen [in the sense of sought] in order to 
bring about the object,”41 whereas in a killing beside the 
intention, which is permissible, one seeks only to defend oneself 
and not to kill one’s attacker, although one knows that one’s 
attacker will be killed.42 
Boyle’s definition of what is intended may be exemplified in 
the case of an abused wife who kills her husband while he is 
sleeping in order that he not kill her when he awakes.  The death 
of the husband would be sought specifically as the means to 
defend herself.  She acts “insuring that the assailant, being dead, 
can threaten no more.”43  On the other hand, Boyle’s definition of 
what is beside the intention may be exemplified in the case of an 
abused wife whose husband is strangling her and the only way to 
 
40 In other words,  
[t]he doctrine of the double effect is based on a distinction between what a 
man foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict 
sense, he intends. He intends in the strictest sense both those things that 
he aims at as ends and those that he aims at as means to his ends. The 
latter may be regretted in themselves but nevertheless desired for the sake 
of the end . . . . By contrast a man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend 
the foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where these are neither 
the end at which he is aiming nor the means to this end. 
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD 
REV. 5, 5–6 (1967). These two different types of consequences have been called 
instrumental and incidental respectively. Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with Double 
Effect, 111 ETHICS 219, 219 (2001). 
41 Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas, 42 THOMIST 649, 664 
(1978). 
42 Id. at 660–62. This definition of intention has been adopted in some form or 
other by several commentators who seek to justify killing in self-defense. See, e.g., 
GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 141–50 (3d ed., 1988); Gareth B. Matthews, Saint 
Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect, in AQUINAS’S MORAL THEORY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF NORMAN KRETZMANN 64, 70, 76 (Scott MacDonald & Eleonore Stump 
eds., 1999) (interpreting Aquinas as providing a “seed bed for the Principle of Double 
Effect”); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of 
Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 343–44 (1989) [hereinafter Quinn, Actions], 
critiqued by Joseph Boyle in Who is Entitled to Double Effect?, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 
475, 483–86 (1991), to which Quinn replied in Reply to Boyle’s Who is Entitled to 
Double Effect?, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 511, 511–14 (1991). It has also been questioned 
by commentators who find it difficult to accept some of its conclusions. See, e.g., 
PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 21–
22 (2002), who thinks that some foreseen effects that are not sought as either an end 
or a means may still be too “close” to the act to be considered unintended. 
43 Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 661. 
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make him stop is to shoot him in the heart.  According to Boyle, 
the death of the husband is not sought as the means of self-
defense.  She acts “in such a way that the assailant’s death is not 
what ends the threat, but is rather a consequence of what stops 
the attack.”44 
The moral significance of this distinction between what is 
intended and what is beside the intention is that it is permissible 
for a person to “direct his intention to the good effect of his action 
and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not a means to 
the former.”45  Of course, not all such acts are permissible.  
Otherwise, one could kill indiscriminately in the act of achieving 
a good effect so long as the killing is a side effect of the act.  Boyle 
provides four conditions, considered classic conditions under the 
doctrine of double effect, that must be satisfied for the act to be 
permissible:  
(1) the agent’s end must be morally acceptable (honestus), 
(2) the cause must be good or at least indifferent, (3) the good 
effect must be immediate [in the sense that the bad effect is not 
a means to the good effect46], and (4) there must be a grave 
reason for positing the cause.47   
In the example of the wife who shoots her husband as he is 
strangling her, Boyle would presumably say that (1) self-defense 
is a morally acceptable end, (2) the act of stopping the strangling 
is good or at least indifferent, (3) the death of the husband is not 
the means by which the wife defends herself but is rather a 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 649–50. 
46 Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90 
ETHICS 527, 531 (1980) (Boyle’s interpretation of the third condition). 
47 Id. at 528 (citing J.P. GURY, COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE MORALIS 8 (A. 
Ballerini ed., Rome, Giachetti, 2d ed., 1869)). A somewhat clearer expression of these 
conditions is:  
(1) acceptable-end condition: the bad effect must not be intended as the end 
or goal of the act; (2) acceptable-act condition: the act must not be bad in 
itself (independently of its causing the bad effect); (3) acceptable-means 
condition: the bad effect must not be intended as a means to the good effect; 
(4) proportionate-reason condition: the agent must have a proportionately 
serious moral reason for performing the act. 
H.M. Giebel, Ends, Means, and Character: Recent Critiques of the Intended-Versus-
Foreseen Distinction and the Principle of Double-Effect, 81 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 447, 
447–48 (2007) (emphasis in original). For the cases examined in this Article, the first 
and second conditions are presumed to exist, and the fourth condition exists because 
the cases address only a life for a life. It is the third condition that causes problems 
by its inadequacy. As will be shown, Aquinas’s discussion of intention in self-defense 
includes what is foreseen when he states tout court that the bad effect (killing) must 
not be intended. 
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consequence of stopping the strangling, and (4) the loss of the 
wife’s life that would otherwise result is a grave reason.  
Therefore, the act is morally permissible.  On the other hand, the 
killing of the husband while he sleeps violates the third 
condition. 
Boyle offers support for his understanding of intention in 
Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense by referring to other contexts 
in which Aquinas uses the term.  Boyle states that on the one 
hand “there is evidence that for Aquinas the object of an act 
which is chosen as a means very often becomes an end and as 
such the object of an intention”48 when it is the means needed to 
achieve the ultimate end.49  An example is the throwing 
overboard of merchandise in order to protect the safety of the 
passengers; “the choice of this means falls under the agent’s 
intention” because it “is clearly a means of achieving safety.”50  
On the other hand, it is possible for the consequence of a chosen 
act not to be an end but rather outside the intention because it is 
not needed to achieve the ultimate end.  An example is the 
trampling underfoot of crops in order to commit fornication; it is 
an act which Aquinas says is foreseen but not intended.51  Boyle 
concludes that “what is [not] ordered to the intended end . . . does 
not fall within the intention,” even if it is foreseen; rather, to be 
intended, the causal consequences of an act must be “part of 
what the will tries to realize by the choice of the means.”52 
 
48 Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 652–53 (citing SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 2, at 640; pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 3, at 641; 
pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 4, at 682–83; pt. I-II, Q. 72, art. 3, ad. 2, at 904; pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 
3, ad. 1, at 912; pt. II-II, Q. 43, art. 3, at 1868–69; pt. II-II, Q. 110, art. 1, at 1664). 
49 Id. at 653–54. Boyle states that “[the] intention bears on the end insofar as it 
can be achieved by certain means.” Id. at 653.  What is outside intention “lacks an 
order to the end,” whereas “[t]he means necessarily involve such an order.” Id. at 
654 (citing Sentences 4.4.1.1.ad2, and SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 
102, art. 1, at 1055). Since “the end is the reason for willing the means,” the willing 
of both the means and the end is one motion of the will. Id. (citing SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 4, at 641–42 and De Veritate 22.14). 
50 Id. at 655–57 (referring to a case mentioned in SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK THREE: PART VI (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of 
Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956)). 
51 Id. at 662 (referring to a case mentioned by Aquinas in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 
supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 915–16). 
52 Id. at 664. In this 1978 article, Boyle set aside the question why “the 
difference between what one intends and what one foresees but does not intend 
[should] be important for the definition and moral evaluation of kinds of human 
acts.” Id. at 650. However, in two later articles he answered this question. In a 1980 
article he stated that the doctrine of double effect is necessary in a world of 
exceptionless moral proscriptions because, when one acts to do some good, it 
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Boyle is correct that the throwing overboard is a means 
ordained to the end of safety while the trampling underfoot is a 
consequence ordained to fornication.  As Aquinas would say, the 
former is an essential determination of the end and therefore 
contained within the species of the end,53 whereas the latter is an 
accident which accrues to the act as an addition.54  However, 
Boyle insists that for Aquinas “the throwing overboard of the 
merchandise is the object of an intention,”55 when in fact Aquinas 
uses the term intention in a special way to refer only to “the 
ultimate end which someone wills on its own account.”56  Aquinas 
does the same in the case of the trampling underfoot where he 
states that the trampler’s “intention is not to do this harm, but to 
commit fornication.”57  This is intention simpliciter or intention 
per se and does not include any reference to the means (throwing 
overboard) by which the ultimate end (safety) is achieved or the 
consequence of another harm (trampling underfoot).  What 
Aquinas is doing in the throwing overboard case is assimilating 
 
“becomes an impossibility” not to bring about some unwanted state of affairs that is 
contrary to one or more basic goods. Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle of 
Double Effect, supra note 46, at 537–38. Presumably, this is because “[w]hat one 
intends and what one permits are both voluntarily brought about, and thus both are 
imputable.” Id. at 530. In a 1991 article he stated that, with an absolute prohibition 
against killing, “there are situations in which, whatever one chooses to do, one will 
inflict the prohibited harm on someone,” and this makes for “a moral norm which 
literally cannot be followed.” Boyle, Who is Entitled to Double Effect?, supra note 42, 
at 486. In having made these statements, Boyle appears to characterize an omission 
to act to save a person as necessarily an infliction of prohibited harm. While this 
may be true for those cases in which there is a duty to save, Boyle does not appear to 
recognize that for Aquinas there may be no duty to save (and therefore no infliction 
of prohibited harm) if the very act of saving results in the foreseen death of another 
person. Aquinas does not accept that there are situations in which a moral norm 
cannot be followed. He says that “no virtue can be contrary to another virtue” 
because the good of virtue “depends on fittingness in relation to some one thing—i.e., 
the reason.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 31, art. 8, ad. 1, at 727. 
Therefore, as Rhonheimer affirms, “in certain circumstances, heroic sacrifices are 
demanded of the human person in order to preserve purity of heart.” MARTIN 
RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON: A THOMIST VIEW OF MORAL 
AUTONOMY 471 (Gerald Malsbury trans., 2000). It may be difficult to do what is 
good, especially when it involves losing one’s mortal life, but this is why we depend 
on God’s grace to see us through. 
53 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 7, at 667–68. 
54 See id. pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 3, at 664–65. 
55 Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 655. 
56 Id. at 654 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 50, at 3.6). Aquinas explains that his 
use of intention here is a willing simpliciter and that the person throwing the 
merchandise overboard “does not will the throwing over simpliciter but for the sake 
of safety.” Id. 
57 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916. 
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the means (throwing overboard) to the evil of an inordinate act; 
neither the means nor the evil is sought in the sense of desired, 
so both are outside intention.58 
Yet, in both the throwing overboard and the trampling 
underfoot cases, when intention refers to the last end it does not 
mean that what is outside intention in each of these acts is 
permissible.  If that were true, then all acts would be permissible 
because evil itself is outside intention as Aquinas states in 
discussing the throwing overboard case.59  Rather, Aquinas states 
that an act derives its goodness from its last end and its suitable 
object (means) and its circumstances (which add to the substance 
of the object), and “an action is not good simply, unless it is good 
in all those ways.”60  Since goodness is an object of the will, it is 
the voluntariness of the act and not the intention of the end that 
gives the act its goodness.  So the means, which is outside the 
intention of the end albeit good only as referred to the end,61 can 
be evil and thus make an act evil.  In both the throwing 
overboard case and the trampling underfoot case, the agent is 
responsible for the evil of what is not the end—the means in the 
former and the circumstances in the latter.  In the throwing 
overboard case, Aquinas states that when “a person wills to do a 
disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be 
attained, . . . . [E]vil consequences and sins are called 
voluntary.”62  In the trampling underfoot case, he states that “the  
 
 
58 Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 654 (quoting AQUINAS, supra 
note 50, at 3.6). See also THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL 1.3, at 70 (Richard Regan 
trans., 2003) [hereinafter AQUINAS, ON EVIL] (“[E]vil as such cannot be intended, nor 
in any way willed or desired, since being desirable has the nature of good, to which 
evil as such is contrary.”). 
59 See also SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 75, art. 1, at 927 
(“[T]he will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and 
intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of 
the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results 
from the lack of direction in the will.”). 
60 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 4 & ad. 3, at 665. Aquinas states that “the aspect of 
good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, 
but also in the means.” Id. pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2, at 627. Insofar as Aquinas 
distinguishes between end and object, he refers to the object that is found in the 
means. Aquinas states that “whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, 
and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances,” and these are 
considered like the substance of an act for the goodness that derives from “their 
utility to the end.” Id. pt. I-II, Q. 7, art. 1, at 623 and art. 2, ad. 1, at 624. 
61 See id. pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2, at 627 (“[T]he means are good and willed, not in 
themselves, but as referred to the end.”). 
62 AQUINAS, supra note 50, at BOOK THREE: PART VI. 
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quantity of the harm done [by the trampling] aggravates the 
sin.”63  So the circumstances being voluntary can cause the act to 
be prohibited if the circumstances are evil.64 
This brings us to the case of self-defense.  Although Boyle 
tries to define intention for Aquinas in the case of self-defense in 
the manner Aquinas used it in the cases of throwing overboard 
and trampling underfoot, Aquinas cannot have used the term in 
the case of self-defense to refer only to the last end.  Aquinas 
states that the “act [of killing], since one’s intention is to save 
one’s own life, is not unlawful.”65  This statement justifies an act 
of killing when it is within the intention to save, but we have 
already seen that the fact that something is not within the 
intention of the end does not justify the means or the 
circumstances.  Therefore, the intention to save in self-defense 
 
63 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916. 
64 Warren Quinn states that Aquinas “seems to think that foreseeable harm 
that comes from action is automatically voluntary . . . . [and] that foreseeable harm 
coming from inaction is voluntary only when the agent could and should have acted 
to prevent it.” Quinn, Actions, supra note 42, at 291–92. He then goes on to say that 
for Aquinas the pursuit of goods in such cases of foreseeable harm is not justified, 
whereas it is justified for “the foreseeably harmful inactions that could not or need 
not have been avoided.” Id. at 292. This is a fair assessment of Aquinas’s position. 
Aquinas states that “those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to 
move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but 
also act for an end . . . . [and] the movements of such things are said to be 
voluntary.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 6, art. 1, at 616. In this 
case the end is foreseen. He also speaks of a foreseeable end when he states that 
“[i]f, on the other hand, harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be 
neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is 
directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin.” Id. 
pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916. Furthermore, Aquinas states that “[w]e apply the word 
voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; 
but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction,” although “the 
cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but 
only then when the agent can and ought to act” as in the case of a helmsman who 
has a duty to steer the ship properly. Id. pt. I-II, Q. 6, art. 3 & ad. 1, at 618. 
However, Quinn does not accept Aquinas’s qualification of acts on this basis for two 
reasons. He thinks that Aquinas would be too rigid in keeping to the rules and that 
it violates Aquinas’s theory of causality. Quinn, Actions, supra note 42, at 293. 
Quinn’s reasons fail to appreciate Aquinas’s flexibility in the application of rules and 
mistake Aquinas’s concept of final causality with efficient causality. See, e.g., SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 51, art. 4, at 1411 (giving an example of the 
virtue of gnome whereby one avoids the application of a common rule of action by 
judging a matter according to higher matters); see also id. pt. I-II, Q. 1, art. 1 & ad. 
1, at 583 (stating that acts proceeding from the will, as they do, “are caused by that 
power in accordance with the nature of its object. . . . [which] is the end and the 
good . . . . [and the end] is first in the order of the agent’s intention . . . . [and thus] a 
cause.”). 
65 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
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must refer broadly to what is willed—not only as an end but also 
as a means and as circumstances—and nothing that is willed in 
justified self-defense can be evil in any of these three ways. 
In what appears to be a move to solidify this broad 
understanding of intent for his treatment of self-defense, 
Aquinas proceeds immediately in the article after his article on 
self-defense to designate what is beside the intention as chance 
happenings.  He states that, according to Aristotle, “chance is a 
cause that acts beside one’s intention,” and concludes that 
“[h]ence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither 
intended nor voluntary,” and “as such, are not sins.”66  Aquinas 
defines chance happenings as what is not foreseen unless it “be 
either an invariable or a frequent consequence of what is 
intended, [in which case] it does not occur fortuitously or by 
chance.”67  Therefore, what is intended in self-defense is what is 
willed and includes all that is foreseen as an end, a means, or a 
consequence. 
Aquinas's definition of intention as what is willed also 
appears in his reference to intention of the means in addition to 
that of the end when he states that “it is not lawful for a man to 
intend killing a man in self-defense,”68 and when he refers to “the 
case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from 
death.”69  In other words, the “word intention indicates an act of 
 
66 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472. In that same article, Aquinas adds that 
“what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, [may be] voluntary and 
intended accidentally” if a person “does not remove something whence homicide 
results whereas he ought to remove it,” so that “if he be occupied with something 
unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape 
being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death.” Id. This covers cases 
of felony murder and negligent homicide. 
67 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK THREE: PART I, at 
45 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956); see also 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (where Aquinas 
states that if the consequences of an action are foreseen or “if the consequences are 
not foreseen, . . . . [and] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of 
cases, . . . the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action, . . . . [but] 
if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the 
goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that 
which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of 
itself”). 
68 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 
(emphasis added). 
69 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 1, at 1471 (emphasis added). Aquinas adds 
that Augustine “says pointedly, for the sake of these things, whereby he indicates the 
intention.” Id. Joseph Mangan finds further support for this meaning in the way 
Aquinas treats killing in self-defense by public authority. He points out that 
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the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders 
something to the end,”70—an act of will that incorporates the end 
and the something ordered to the end. Aquinas states in his 
commentary on Aristotle that 
if someone wills some cause from which he knows that a 
particular effect results, . . . . although he may well not will that 
effect in itself, nevertheless he rather wills that effect to exist 
than that the cause not exist, . . . . so it is unreasonable for 
someone to will to do unjust things and not will to be unjust.71   
The willing of the end includes the willing of the means. 
A small number of commentators on Aquinas are in accord 
with this interpretation of intention in Aquinas’s discussion of 
self-defense.72  Elizabeth Anscombe states that the doctrine of 
 
“according to St. Thomas’ own use of the word in article seven, ‘to intend’ also 
signifies to intend as a means to an end; for he limits the lawfulness of killing by 
public authority to killing as a means, or as an intermediary end, or as a proximate 
end to that of the common good.” Joseph Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the 
Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 41, 49 (1949). 
70 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 1, ad. 3, at 640. 
71 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SENTENTIA LIBRI ETHICORUM lib. 3, lect. 12, n.6 
(Roma: Commissio Leonina 1969), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ctc02.html (“Si 
enim aliquis vult aliquam causam ex qua scit sequi talem effectum, . . . . [q]uamvis 
forte non velit illum effectum secundum se, potius tamen vult illum effectum esse 
quam causa non sit. . . . ergo irrationabile est quod aliquis velit iniusta facere et non 
velit esse iniustus . . . .”). 
72 There are also a number of ways, such as the following, which agree neither 
with this definition of intention nor one based on the doctrine of double effect: 
 One way to interpret “intention” is to refer it solely to the end desired and not 
the means. This interpretation has been refuted in the literature. See, e.g., the 
careful analysis of Jean Porter who states that “this line of analysis can justify 
almost anything” and that rather, according to Aquinas, “we can legitimately say 
that the agent intends an act that is chosen as a means towards, or a way of 
enjoying some more ultimate end.” Jean Porter, Choice, Causality, and Relation: 
Aquinas’s Analysis of the Moral Act and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 89 AM. CATH. 
PHIL. Q. 479, 480 (2015). Nevertheless, Porter believes that Aquinas allows killing in 
self-defense when there is no other alternative possible. Consequently, the 
application of her excellent analysis of intention to Aquinas’s discussion of self-
defense is somewhat torturous and ultimately does not explain why Aquinas uses 
the term “intent” in his discussion of self-defense in the way he does. See id. at 497–
501 (applying her analysis of intention). 
 Andrew Jaspers states (correctly in my opinion) that Aquinas, in SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 1, ad. 3, at 640, “implies that the 
criteria for determining the moral specification of the means to an end will be the 
same as those of the end.” Andrew Jaspers, Intentio and Praeter Intentionem in the 
Constitution of the Moral Object in Thomas Aquinas, 81 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. 
ASS’N 149, 152 (2007). However, he adds a caveat to his interpretation of SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (incorrectly in my opinion) 
that the circumstance of self-defense “fundamentally change[s] the constitution of 
the moral object so as to make an otherwise questionable end a legitimate one.” Id. 
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 Steven Long includes the essential matter of an act, such as its lethality, in the 
moral object but derives the act’s species from the end to which it is ordered, such as 
self-defense, so that one is permitted to use a lethal self-defense if necessary to 
survive. See Steven A. Long, A Brief Disquisition Regarding the Nature of the Object 
of the Moral Act According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 67 THOMIST 45, 70 (2003), 
critiqued by Steven Jensen in A Long Discussion Regarding Steven A. Long’s 
Interpretation of the Moral Species, 67 THOMIST 623, 623–43 (2003) [hereinafter 
Jensen, Long Discussion], to which Long replied in Response to Jensen on the Moral 
Object, 3 NOVA ET VETERA 101, 101–08 (2005), to which Jensen replied in The Role 
of Teleology in the Moral Species, 63 REV. METAPHYSICS 3, 3–27 (2009), to which 
Long replied in Engaging Thomist Interlocutors, 9 NOVA ET VETERA 267, 267–95 
(2011). See generally STEVEN A. LONG, THE TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR OF THE MORAL 
ACT 10–31 (2007) [hereinafter LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR], for Long’s theory. 
Long justifies the lethality of an act of killing in self-defense (including the killing of 
a mentally incompetent aggressor) by its per se order to the end of self-defense, but 
he does not explain why the lethality of an act of killing to save the mother’s life in a 
craniotomy (which he recognizes as an act with the same structure as self-defense) is 
not also justified by its per se order to the end of saving the mother—except to say 
that to “kill an innocent child [in a craniotomy] is under negative precept.” Id. at 104 
n.1. Long leaves unexplained why killing an innocent child is under negative precept 
and killing a faultless aggressor is not. 
 Gregory Reichberg argues that Aquinas uses intention to refer to the purpose of 
avenging a wrong and qualifies that which refers to the purpose of defending oneself 
as outside intention. Claiming support from the work of Hugo Grotius and Francisco 
de Vitoria, he interprets Aquinas as saying that, when there is no other means of 
escape, it is permissible to have the purpose to kill without it being intended. See 
GREGORY M. REICHBERG, THOMAS AQUINAS ON WAR AND PEACE 174, 183–85 (2017). 
However, to support his thesis, Reichberg uses sources to which Aquinas does not 
refer, and he seemingly ignores the importance of Aquinas’s reference to Augustine’s 
DE LIBERO ARBITRIO which, as Reichberg acknowledges, denies the use of foreseen 
lethal force in self-defense. Id. at 185–92. He also uses the reference to Augustine’s 
Letter 47 to Publicola apparently as support for the prohibition on revenge. Id. at 
187–88. However, Reichberg omits to state that Augustine tells Publicola that he 
disagrees “with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him.” 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 1 & ad. 1, at 1471 
(quoting and approving AUGUSTINE, LETTER 47 TO PUBLICOLA (Ep. xlvii) ¶ 5 (398)). 
Although Reichberg may be right that there were some canonists who were willing 
to advocate a foreseen lethal defense in the absence of any other escape, there is no 
evidence that Aquinas adopted their point of view, especially given Aquinas’s direct 
reference to Augustine’s prohibition. Rather, it appears Aquinas defines intention 
precisely as what Reichberg rejects—“as a pure and simple synonym of voluntas 
(volition), which broadly designates a determination of the will (and hence is 
applicable both to the intention of the end and the choice of a means).” REICHBERG, 
supra, at 194. Reichberg rejects the case that Aquinas uses for what is outside 
intention, which is an accidental homicide where one takes the risk that his act will 
kill the aggressor but does not know it will. Id. at 177. 
 Daniel Weiss states that for Aquinas “an action that foreknowingly causes the 
death of innocents can never be legitimate, regardless of whether that action causes 
death ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly.’ ” Daniel H. Weiss, Aquinas’s Opposition to Killing the 
Innocent and its Distinctiveness Within the Christian Just War Tradition, 45 J. REL. 
ETHICS 481, 486 (2017). In his discussion opposing the application of the 
intended/foreseen distinction of the double effect doctrine to cases of innocent 
deaths, Weiss makes two arguments that are notable. First, he points to the fact 
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double effect is incorrectly ascribed to Aquinas insofar as it 
excludes from an agent’s intention the side effects of an act that 
are foreseen but not the purpose of the act.73  Thomas Cavanaugh 
interprets Aquinas to define intention in self-defense as 
knowingly and willingly killing another as an inevitable 
consequence, and he states that what is beside intention is a 
risked killing which results from “knowingly and willingly 
endangering another’s life and thereby killing.”74  He states that 
Aquinas does not allow intentional killing even if it is the only 
 
that in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, Aquinas 
distinguishes between a legitimate act, in which an agent who does not foresee the 
death his act will cause exercises due care, and an illegitimate act in which an agent 
who does not foresee the death his act will cause does not exercise due care. Id. at 
489. Weiss then argues that “if liability holds even without presuming the agent’s 
conscious awareness of the danger, an agent would be liable a fortiori in a situation 
in which she was consciously aware that the action could likely cause death, and yet 
engaged in the action nevertheless.” Id. at 489–90 (citing DANIEL M. BELL JR., JUST 
WAR AS CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP: RECENTERING THE TRADITION IN THE CHURCH 
RATHER THAN THE STATE 218 (2009)). Second, he points to Aquinas’s discussion of 
the parable of the wheat and the tares (Matthew 13:24-30) on the basis of which  
Aquinas says, if one has to choose between unintentionally killing the 
innocent while seeking justly to slay sinners, on the one hand, or refraining 
from slaying the wicked because doing so would unintentionally kill the 
innocent, on the other hand, one should choose the latter, even if it means 
letting the wicked go unpunished for the time being. 
Id. at 494; accord BELL, supra, at 217. However, Weiss does not extend his argument 
to the aggressor in a case of self-defense. He interprets Aquinas in SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, as addressing and 
legitimating the killing of an unjust and sinful attacker. He states, “Aquinas holds 
that in the case of self-defense a private individual is permitted to engage in actions 
that cause the death of the sinful attacker if that is the only way that the attack can 
be prevented” as long as “the individual intends simply to ward off the attack.” Id. at 
492. Weiss does not consider that the aggressor in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 
1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, need not be unjust or sinful and that Aquinas’s 
opposition to the doctrine of double effect for private individuals in the case of those 
who are innocent also applies in the case of those who are unjust and sinful—in 
other words, that Aquinas opposes private acts that foresee the deaths of sinful as 
well as innocent people. 
 For an extended discussion of several other definitions of intention and the 
problems they present, see Joseph Shaw, Intention in Ethics, 36 CAN. J. PHIL. 187, 
187–223 (2006). 
73 G.E.M. Anscombe, Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’, 
56 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS’N 12, 23–25 (1982). 
74 T.C. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING 
EVIL 10 (2006) [hereinafter CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT]. For a good discussion of 
Aquinas’s notion of risked killing, see Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s Account of 
Double Effect, 61 THOMIST 107, 111–19 (1997) [hereinafter Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s 
Account]. Cavanaugh also sees a third category of accidental killing to be 
distinguished from risked killing. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT, supra, at 10. 
Aquinas treats accidental killing in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 
64, art. 8, at 1472. 
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means to save one’s life,75 but “risking another’s life is not 
intending the other’s death,”76 and “an action in which the 
defendant risks killing the assailant” is permitted.77  Steven 
Jensen also interprets Aquinas to define intention in self-defense 
as knowingly and willingly killing another as an unavoidable 
consequence, and he states that Aquinas prohibits such 
intentional killing even when it is the only way to preserve one’s 
life from attack.78  He states that if the act is not a knowing and 
willing killing, such as an act to save oneself by deflecting an 
attack with a sword, the act is permitted even if the act results 
incidentally in the killing of the assailant.79  Denis Sullivan 
introduces an interesting twist on Aquinas’s use of intention in 
his discussion of self-defense.  He interprets Aquinas to define 
intention as referring only to the final end and therefore as not 
relevant to the determination of which killings (as means or side 
 
75 CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT, supra note 74, at 10. 
76 Id. at 11. 
77 Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s Account, supra note 74, at 109. Drawing on the words 
of John Paul II, Cavanaugh states that “[t]hose who witness to justice by forgoing 
those acts by which they could save themselves [in situations where the only chance 
to save oneself is to knowingly kill an aggressor] merit recognition as martyrs,” and 
the choice of martyrdom to do the just thing in this situation is not merely faith-
based but also rational. Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Double-Effect Reasoning, 
Craniotomy, and Vital Conflicts: A Case of Contemporary Catholic Casuistry, 11 
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 453, 462–63 (2011). 
78 Steven J. Jensen, The Trouble with Secunda Secundae 64, 7: Self-Defense, 83 
MOD. SCHOOLMAN 143, 144 (2006) [hereinafter Jensen, The Trouble]. As for “actions 
in which we kill as a means to preserve our lives,” Jensen states that “I think that 
such actions are justified, but then I also think that STh II-II, q. 64, a. 7 does not 
justify them.” Jensen, Long Discussion, supra note 72, at 643. 
79 Jensen, The Trouble, supra note 78, at 143–44, 153–54. Jensen does suggest 
an alternative account based on his read of other passages in Aquinas that would 
permit a defender, in the absence of public officials who can help, to assume the role 
of a public official who is permitted to kill. Id. at 154. However, Jensen’s support for 
this alternative account is weak. He cites to SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. 
II-II, Q. 40, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1360, which he says “recognizes that the private 
individual can sometimes be charged with public authority.”  Jensen, The Trouble, 
supra note 78, at 162 n.45. But this source states only that 
to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the 
sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by 
the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to take the sword, but to use it as 
commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 40, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1360. The focus is 
on a private individual being “commissioned by another,” not on a private individual 
assuming the status on her own. Be that as it may, Jensen nevertheless emphasizes 
that one cannot derive such an interpretation legitimately from Aquinas’s discussion 
of self-defense as many commentators attempt to do through the doctrine of double 
effect. Jensen, The Trouble, supra note 78, at 154–56. 
2018] AQUINAS RECONSIDERED 85 
effects) in self-defense are permitted.80  According to Sullivan, 
Aquinas always prohibits killing as a means and sometimes 
prohibits killing as a side effect, but means and side effects are 
always outside intention.  Sullivan then uses certain phrases in 
Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense to show that, when a killing 
is a side effect, it is prohibited when it is foreseen as a certainty 
and permitted only when it is seen merely as a risk.81 
The analysis in this Article argues for an interpretation of 
Aquinas that prohibits an act of self-defense in which one 
foresees another’s death from an attack on the vital life support 
of that other, and that permits an act of self-defense in which 
there is only a risk of another’s death.  It does not restrict 
Aquinas’s definition of intention only to the end as Sullivan does, 
but sees intention in Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense as an 
act of will embracing any death that is foreseen to result from the 
act.  Therefore, it rejects Boyle’s doctrine of double effect.  When 
Aquinas states that “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a 
man in self-defense,”82 he means to include foreseen killings 
within the meaning of “intend.”  Thus, he prohibits the foreseen 
killing of an aggressor even if killing the aggressor is the only 
way in which one can save one’s own life. 
Most people today do not accept the moral soundness of this 
prohibition.  The Catholic Church herself permits killing in self-
defense when the only way to save one’s life is by killing an 
aggressor.83  Yet, as shown above, Aquinas maintains that God 
retains authority over the life and death of the human person, a 
person made in the image of God, and one should love one’s 
neighbor for God’s sake.  Even though one’s basic natural 
 
80 Denis F. Sullivan, The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of Moral 
Responsibility, 64 THOMIST 423, 437 (2000). 
81 Id. at 423–24, 435–37, 448. 
82 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
83 The encyclical EVANGELIUM VITAE by Pope Saint John Paul II states that “it 
happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes 
involves taking his life.” JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 
(THE GOSPEL OF LIFE) ¶ 55 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE]. The CATECHISM 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 13, at ¶ 2264, states that “[s]omeone who 
defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a 
lethal blow.” Both sources cite to SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, 
art. 7, at 1471, Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense, as authority for this position. See 
id. at n.66; EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra, at n.45. I do not oppose the teaching of the 
Catholic Church. I do interpret SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, 
art. 7, at 1471, differently to mandate a prohibition against killing even in the case 
where one will lose one’s life and the lives of one’s loved ones to an aggressor if the 
aggressor is not killed. 
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inclination is to preserve oneself and one’s loved ones,84  this 
inclination should be governed by one’s charitable love of God.  
We are created to love God85 and have our being in God.86  This is 
what makes us human.  Therefore, one finds the real 
preservation of self in loving God and not in turning away from 
Him in sin.  Aquinas notes that “nobody may lawfully commit 
simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to 
save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the 
life of the body.”87  Likewise, in the case of killing, which is a 
more serious offense,88 one must rise above the natural desire to 
kill in self-defense to the charitable desire to preserve one’s 
spiritual life through loving God in fellowship with one’s 
neighbor. 
Aquinas is not alone in advocating a prohibition of killing in 
self-defense.  Augustine likewise condemns self-defensive killing 
when he says that to arm oneself against one’s neighbor may 
arise from “a warmth of spirit capable of good” or from a “hatred 
of the injustice of others,” but this “carnal love” is nevertheless a 
sin.89  Aquinas affirms Augustine by quoting two passages from 
 
84 Aquinas himself affirms that “in man there is first of all an inclination to good 
in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: 
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its 
nature.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009. 
85 Id. pt. I, Q. 60, art. 5, at 301. 
86 Id. pt. I, Q. 18, art. 4 & ad. 1, at 102. 
87 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 4, at 1471, which Aquinas implicitly affirms in 
his answer to this objection. The objector has suggested that since one cannot 
fornicate or commit adultery to save one’s own life, “no man may lawfully take 
another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life.” Id. Aquinas replies that 
“[t]he act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of 
one’s own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man’s life.” Id. 
pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 4, at 1472. In other words, since one can defend oneself 
with moderation even if it might (but not necessarily will) kill the other person, 
there will be times when the aggressor will be killed. 
88 Aquinas states that “it is evident that fornication and adultery are less 
grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life: since the latter is most 
grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.” Id. pt. II-
II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469. 
89 Augustine states that: 
[H]e uses the sword, who, without the command or sanction of any 
superior, or legitimate authority, arms himself against man’s life. For truly 
the Lord had given commandment to His disciples to take the sword, but 
not to smite with the sword. Was it then at all unbeseeming that Peter 
after this sin [his move to cut off the servant’s ear in the Garden of 
Gethsemane] should become ruler of the Church, as Moses after smiting 
the Egyptian was made ruler and chief of the Synagogue? For both 
transgressed the rule not through hardened ferocity, but through a warmth 
of spirit capable of good; both through hatred of the injustice of others; both 
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his work.  In one, Augustine tells Publicola that he disagrees 
“with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by 
him.”90  In the other, Augustine approves Evodius who questions 
how men can be “free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who 
are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these contemptible 
things [that is, one’s own life].”91  Aquinas notes that “[t]he words 
 
sinned through love, the one for his brother, the other for his Lord, though 
a carnal love. 
AUGUSTINE, REPLY TO FAUSTUS THE MANICHÆAN 22.70, in THOMAS AQUINAS, 
CATENA AUREA: GOSPEL OF MATTHEW 26.51–54 (John Henry Parker trans., London 
1842). Ambrose refers to the same passage in Matthew 26:52 and states that “when 
[a Christian, a just and a wise man] meets with an armed robber he cannot return 
his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbor.” 
AMBROSE, ON THE DUTIES OF THE CLERGY III, 4.27 (H. de Romestin trans.), in 10 
NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, SECOND SERIES 71 (Philip Schaff and Henry 
Wace eds. 2004) (1896) [hereinafter 10 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS]. 
90 AUGUSTINE, LETTER 47 TO PUBLICOLA (Ep. xlvii) ¶ 5 (398), as quoted and 
approved by Aquinas in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, 
obj. 1 & ad. 1, at 1471. Augustine’s letter to Publicola mentions cases that are not 
killings when one’s instruments are used by others, such as when a man is killed by 
one’s wall falling upon that man when that man is throwing it down, or when one’s 
ox may gore or one’s horse may kick a man to death, and he confirms the liceity of 
owning these instruments despite their being used in an act that results in death 
because the act does not intend the death. AUGUSTINE, LETTER XLVII OF LETTERS 
OF ST. AUGUSTINE, in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, FIRST SERIES 293–94 
(Philip Schaff ed., 2004) (1886). Augustine states that the passage in the Sermon on 
the Mount in which Christ teaches to resist not evil is “not to make us neglect the 
duty of restraining men from sin,” but “[a]s to killing others [in one’s private 
capacity] in order to defend one’s own life, I do not approve of this.” Id. at 293, 
referring to the passage in Matthew 5:39. 
91 AUGUSTINE, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 1.5, as quoted and approved by Aquinas in 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 2 & ad. 1, at 1471. In 
this same passage Augustine states that “the law is not just which grants a traveler 
the power to kill a highway robber so that he himself may not be killed.” ST. 
AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL I, ¶ 33 (Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. 
Hackstaff trans. 1964, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 2d Prtg. 1964). There is 
nothing to suggest that either Augustine or Aquinas are thinking of a premeditated 
situation such as Kevin Flannery suggests when he uses the example of “a man 
[who] has a neighbor whom he thinks could very well attack him someday, so he 
eliminates that threat in advance by means of a private execution.” Kevin L. 
Flannery, The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas, 83 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 421, 433 
(2009). Rather, the mention of a highway robber indicates that Augustine, and 
Aquinas who agrees with him, are thinking of an immediate threat that one will be 
killed unless one kills one’s assailant, and it is not a just act to take the assailant’s 
life in order to save one’s own. On another note, in anticipation of Ghandi who will 
be discussed shortly in note 107, infra, it is interesting that Bonaventure cites to 
Augustine’s DE LIBERO ARBITRIO to maintain that a perfect person is not allowed to 
kill in order to save oneself from death but that such a killing is excusable in an 
imperfect person. BONAVENTURE, COLLATIONS ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 87–88 
(F. Edward Coughlin ed., Paul Spaeth trans. 1995). Aquinas does not address this 
last point. 
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quoted from Augustine [in each of these texts] refer to the case 
when one man intends to kill another to save himself from 
death.”92 
There is also a history of support for the prohibition against 
a private individual’s foreseen killing behind Aquinas’s reference 
to the jurists in his discussion of self-defense, according to whom 
“it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed 
the limits of a blameless defense.”93  There is no indication in this 
passage that, if the force is foreseen to kill, the killing constitutes 
a blameless defense.  Rather, as one commentator states, “the 
prerogative to use force to repel force [in this passage] seems to 
be restricted to public authority alone.”94  The early Church 
Fathers’ doctrine supports this restriction.  Origen speaks of the 
Christians as “adopt[ing] laws of so exceedingly mild a character 
as not to allow them, when it was their fate to be slain as sheep, 
on any occasion to resist their persecutors.”95  Cyprian mentions 
the soldiers of Christ in battle who “do not in turn assail their 
assailants, since it is not lawful for the innocent even to kill the 
guilty.”96  Lactantius states that “if any violence is offered to us, 
we must endure it with equanimity, since the death of an 
innocent person cannot be unavenged, and since we have a great 
Judge who alone always has the power of taking vengeance in 
His hands.”97  This doctrine extended beyond personal defense 
 
92 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 1, at 1471. 
93 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (citing Pope Gregory IX, DECRETAL 
SIGNIFICASTI in DE HOMICIDIO c. XVIII, in DECRETALES GREGORII P. IX lib. V, tit. 
XII). The summary quote by Aquinas is “vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine 
inculpatae tutelae.” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 
7, at 12 (Leonine ed., 1897), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3061.html. The 
full passage reads: “all laws and rights permit the repulsion of force by force; except 
that it should be within the limits of a blameless defense, not to take vengeance, but 
to repulse injury (vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant; quia tamen 
id debet fieri cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed 
ad iniuriam propulsandam).” DECRETALIUM COLLECTIONES, in 2 CORPUS JURIS 
CANONICI 801 (Aemilius Ludwig Richter ed., 2nd ed., Leipzig, Tauchnitz 1881) (my 
translation). 
94 Rojas, supra note 38, at 99. 
95 ORIGEN, AGAINST CELSUS III.6, in 4 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS 467 (Alexander 
Roberts and James Donaldson eds., 2008) (1885) [hereinafter ANTE-NICENE 
FATHERS]. 
96 CYPRIAN, EPISTLE LVI TO CORNELIUS IN EXILE, CONCERNING HIS 
CONFESSION, in 5 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 95, at 351. 
97 LACTANTIUS, THE DIVINE INSTITUTES III, 18, in 7 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, 
supra note 95, at 89. For these and other examples of the prohibition by the early 
Church Fathers of foreseen lethal defenses, see generally THE EARLY CHURCH ON 
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even to war and the administration of justice.98  With the Edict of 
Milan, which established the religious toleration of Christianity 
in the Roman Empire in 313, the prohibition against killing by 
those with public responsibility was relaxed, but the prohibition 
against killing in self-defense by a private individual remained a 
doctrine of the Church for several centuries thereafter, even up 
to the time of Gratian less than a century before Aquinas’s 
reference to the jurists.99 
In modern times a number of important voices have 
condemned self-defensive killing.  Mahatma Ghandi understood 
all too well the difficulty in this restraint, but he advocated non-
violence (ahimsa) in the face of death from an aggressor.  He 
stated that “[a] non-violent man or woman will and should die 
without retaliation, anger or malice, in self-defense or in 
defending the honor of his women folk.100  He called it “the 
highest form of bravery”101 because it is not easy to attain this 
spirit of non-violence.  It requires “as complete self-purification 
as is humanly possible,” which “is a matter of long training in 
self-denial and appreciation of the hidden forces within 
ourselves.”102  Ghandi remarked that “[n]on-violence is impossible 
 
KILLING: A COMPREHENSIVE SOURCEBOOK ON WAR, ABORTION, AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (Ronald J. Sider ed., 2012). 
98 C. John Cadoux states: 
that in the third century the conviction that Christianity was incompatible 
with the shedding of blood, either in war or in the administration of justice, 
was not only maintained and vigorously defended by eminent individuals 
like Tertullianus of Carthago, Hippolutos of Rome, and Origenes of 
Palestine and Egypt, but was widely held and acted on in the Churches up 
and down Christendom. 
C. JOHN CADOUX, THE EARLY CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO WAR:  A CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 128 (1919). 
99 See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A 
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 218, 220–21 (1988) (citing Ambrose and Augustine 
in the fourth century and the Decretum of Gratian in the twelfth century). Gratian 
discusses self-defense and killing in Cause 23 of the Decretum. See, e.g., Decreti 
Secunda Pars C. 23 q. 5 c. 8 of Decretum Magistri Gratiani, in 1 CORPUS JURIS 
CANONICI 932 (Aemilius Ludwig Richter ed., 2d ed., Leipzig, Tauchnitz, 1879). Rojas 
translates this passage as, “it is prohibited by this precept [against killing] that 
anyone on his own authority be armed to murder anyone, not that the accused be 
put to death by command of the law.” Rojas, supra note 38, at 98. 
100 MOHANDAS GHANDI, GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE: SELECTED TEXTS FROM 
MOHANDAS K. GHANDI’S NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR 46 (Thomas Merton ed., 
1965). 
101 Id. at 46. 
102 Id. at 36. Thomas Merton captured the essence of Ghandi’s spirit of non-
violence when he said that it “sprang from an inner realization of spiritual unity in 
himself”; it was not “a means of achieving unity” but rather “the fruit of inner unity 
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without humility” and can only be sustained “by the higher 
promptings of an unseen power.”103  It requires “a living belief in 
God.”104  Ghandi said that Jesus gives us a good example.105  Only 
if God instills within one the charity by which one feels one with 
one’s opponent—so that “it is better that you should die at his 
hands than that he, your ignorant brother, should die at yours”—
can one practice non-violence.106  Ghandi recognized that not all 
can practice this bravery based on charity.  He continues on to 
say that “[i]f the people are not ready for the exercise of the non-
violence of the brave, they must be ready for the use of force in 
self-defense” because “[t]here is nothing more demoralizing than 
fake non-violence of the weak and impotent.”107 
As Thomas Merton remarks, Ghandi’s non-violence is “not a 
sentimental evasion or denial of the reality of evil,” but rather “a 
clearsighted acceptance of the necessity to use the force and the 
presence of evil as a fulcrum for good and for liberation.”108  It is 
the refusal to cooperate with evil and the determination to 
overcome evil by the mercy of forgiving the oppressor and 
“assum[ing] the common burden of evil which weighs both on 
 
already achieved.” Thomas Merton, Introduction to GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE, 
supra note 100, at 10. Merton adds: 
Indeed this is the explanation for Gandhi’s apparent failure (which became 
evident to him at the end of his own life). He saw that his followers had not 
reached the inner unity that he had realized in himself, and that their 
satyagraha was to a great extent a pretense, since they believed it to be a 
means to achieve unity and freedom, while he saw that it must necessarily 
be the fruit of inner freedom. 
Id. 
103 GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE, supra note 100, at 50. Ghandi adds that if it had 
been through his own will, he “should have miserably failed.” Id. 
104 Id. at 63. 
105 Id. at 55 (“Jesus was the most active resister known perhaps to history. This 
was non-violence par excellence.”). 
106 Id. at 82–83. 
107 Id. at 56. Ghandi explained that 
[i]f an individual or group of people are unable or unwilling to follow this 
great law of life, retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best 
though a long way off from the first. Cowardice is impotence worse than 
violence. The coward desires revenge but being afraid to die, he looks to 
others, maybe to the government of the day, to do the work of defense for 
him. 
Id. at 46–47. Ghandi’s position is reminiscent of that of Bonaventure who cites to 
Augustine’s DE LIBERO ARBITRIO to maintain that a perfect person is not allowed to 
kill in order to save oneself from death but that such a killing is excusable in an 
imperfect person. BONAVENTURE, supra note 91, at 87–88. 
108 Merton, supra note 102, at 18. 
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oneself and one’s adversary.”109  Ghandi recognized that the 
difficulty that one has in achieving this state of ahimsa (non-
violence) leads many to fail.  In fact, at the end of his life he felt 
that he himself had failed to attain “sufficient detachment and 
control over [his] temper and emotions” so as to bring non-
violence to India.110  What he thought was ahimsa among his 
followers turned out merely to be the “passive resistance . . . of 
the weak.”111  Nevertheless, he continued to proclaim that there 
was “no hope for the aching world except through the narrow and 
straight path of non-violence.”112 
Dorothy Day, a journalist and Catholic convert who co-
founded the Catholic Worker movement in the United States, 
and Johannes Ude, a Catholic priest and theologian in Austria, 
both lived in the early twentieth century and actively advocated 
restraint from killing in self-defense.  Dorothy Day states: 
It is a natural right, as taught by the Church, and it is only 
because of the life of grace, opened to us by the coming of Jesus, 
that we hold to our pacifist stand throughout race war, class 
war and every other type of war.  As a pacifist, and my pacifism 
is based on the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount, I must 
accept the supernatural point of view and the idea that absolute 
pacifism is to be aimed at.113 
Johannes Ude maintains that “those Christian moral 
philosophers and theologians who approve of self-defense grant 
the right of killing one’s aggressor if one cannot otherwise defend 
oneself,” but “Christ demands exactly the opposite . . . .”114  
Quoting from the Sermon on the Mount, he reminds us that 
“Christ says, ‘Do not resist evil,’ ” and this means that “the 
advocates of self-defense are wrong in saying one may kill an 




109 Id. at 18–19, 22–23. Non-violence is love “lived in the face of untruth and 
hatred, the persistent and flagrant denial of love.” Id. at 17. 
110 GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE, supra note 100, at 92. 
111 Id. at 93. 
112 Id. at 92. 
113 Dave Dellinger, Robert Franklin Williams, Martin Luther King, Jr., & 
Dorothy Day, Are Pacifists Willing to Be Negroes?  A 1950s Dialogue on Fighting 
Racism and Militarism, Using Nonviolence and Armed Struggle, in WE HAVE NOT 
BEEN MOVED: RESISTING RACISM AND MILITARISM IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 21, 32 
(Elizabeth Martínez et al. eds., 2012). 
114 JOHANNES UDE, YOU SHALL NOT KILL 47 (Ingrid M. Leder trans., 2016). 
115 Id. 
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support Aquinas’s position that when it is a choice between an 
individual’s killing in self-defense or accepting death, one should 
aim at absolute pacifism. 
Leo Tolstoy, who greatly influenced Ghandi in his thinking, 
was himself greatly influenced by the passage in the Sermon on 
the Mount where Christ taught that one must not resist evil.  In 
one of his letters, Tolstoy asks “[h]ow (to use the stock example) 
is a man to act when he sees a criminal killing or outraging a 
child, and he can only save the child by killing the criminal?”: His 
answer is that 
[i]f a man be a Christian, and consequently acknowledges God, 
and sees the meaning of life in fulfilling His will, then, however 
ferocious the assailant, however innocent or lovely the child, he 
has even less ground to abandon the God-given law, and to do to 
the criminal as the criminal wishes to do to the child.”116 
Aquinas is not a pacifist insofar as he allows killing by one 
acting under public authority117 and insofar as he allows acts of 
self-defense that put an aggressor at risk of death118 even when 
 
116 Letter from Leo Tolstoy to Ernest Howard Crosby (Jan. 12, 1896), in THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF LYOF N. TOLSTOI: ESSAYS, LETTER, MISCELLANIES 324, 330–31 
(1899). For an elaboration of Tolstoy’s doctrine, see generally LEO TOLSTOY, ‘THE 
KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU:’ CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTIC RELIGION BUT AS 
A NEW THEORY OF LIFE 1–48, 184–208 (Constance Garnett trans., William 
Heinemann, London 1894). 
117 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, where 
Aquinas says that 
it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for 
such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-
defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting 
against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, 
although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity. 
This relegation of killing for the common good to only those who have public 
authority is reiterated in other parts of his discussion of murder. See id. pt. II-II, Q. 
64, art. 3, at 1467–1468 (“[T]he care of the common good is entrusted to persons of 
rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can 
lawfully put evildoers to death.”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469 (“[I]t is not 
lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority.”). Therefore, 
when an individual acts on his own authority, it is in no way lawful to kill any 
person, innocent or otherwise. See id. 
118 Aquinas states that it is not “necessary for salvation that a man omit the act 
of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to 
take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.  
In other words, there is no unlawfulness in the killing of another as long as one does 
not know that he will take the other’s life by his act. One can defend up to the point 
that one becomes certain that the other will be killed, but at that point the defender 
must refrain because the killing becomes foreseen and therefore a matter of 
intention and “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense . . . .” 
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. Short of the point of killing, moderate self-defense 
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the aggressor is an innocent person.119  He understands the 
passage in Matthew 5:39 where Christ admonishes “not to resist 
evil” in two ways.  One may forgive the wrong done to oneself, 
which is a good interpretation, or one can tolerate the wrongs 
done to others, which is a bad interpretation “if one be able to 
resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner.”120  He then quotes 
from Ambrose to explain that a becoming manner is full justice—
“[t]he courage whereby a man in battle defends his country 
against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends 
against robbers . . . .”121  What are not becoming are acts of 
foreseen killings.122 
There are some saving acts in which the death of another 
may be foreseen and could be prevented, but they are not 
killings.  Aquinas permits, or arguably permits, these saving acts 
and even praises them when they result in the sacrifice of oneself 




can take the risk that the other’s life may be taken, as long as the defense is in 
“proportion to the end” in the sense that it does not use “more than necessary 
violence” or require killing the other person.  Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
Aquinas confirms in another passage that “if his sole intention be to withstand the 
injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, . . . .” Id. 
pt. II-II, Q. 41, art. 1, at 1363. 
119 In his discussion of self-defense, Aquinas uses the term aggressor, not unjust 
aggressor, to refer to a person against whom one acts in self-defense. See id. pt. II-II, 
Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. By defining aggressor broadly, Aquinas includes an insane 
aggressor to whom no fault can be attributed, thereby including an innocent person 
within the term. 
120 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 188, art. 3, ad. 1, at 1995. 
121 Id. (quoting from AMBROSE, DE OFFICIIS MINISTRORUM 1.27). The idea of 
resistance here places an emphasis on removing harm, not on harming, just as 
Aquinas states: “Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be 
inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with 
the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 108, 
art. 2, at 1657. 
122 This interpretation of the phrase “do not resist the evil one” is in accord with 
John L. McKenzie, The Gospel According to Matthew, in 2 THE JEROME BIBLICAL 
COMMENTARY 62, 72 (1968), who remarks on its highly controversial nature:  
The customary principle of self-defense is rejected by this saying of Jesus; 
and the customary principle is not replaced by another principle of self-
defense. The saying is probably the most paradoxical of all the sayings of 
the passage and has certainly been the object of more rationalization than 
any other. 
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B. Permission 
There are four situations where Aquinas permits, or 
arguably permits, an act that involves the death of a person: 
(1) If a killing is not foreseen123 and is not a natural and frequent 
consequence of an act124 and is not a consequence of an unlawful 
or negligent act,125 the act that results in the killing is not an act 
of killing because the killing is not voluntary.  (2) If one sacrifices 
oneself in an act of charitable love, the act that results in killing 
is not an act of killing because the self-sacrifice does not take 
one’s life but rather offers it to God in charitable love.126  (3) If the 
only way to save oneself or another is by retaining or removing a 
vital life support from a person who one knows will be killed as a 
result but the vital life support belongs to the person saved 
(whether oneself or another), the act that results in killing is not 
an act of killing because one may prefer oneself in the use of one’s 
own vital life support.127  (4) If the only way to save oneself or 
those under one’s charge is by ducking, blocking, or redirecting a 
deadly force even though one knows that someone will be killed 
as a result, the act that results in killing is not an act of killing 
because one may prefer oneself and those under one’s charge in 
avoiding the deadly force.128  Each of these situations is explained 
more fully below. 
 
 
123 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 
(regarding unforeseen chance happenings). 
124 See id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (“[I]f the consequences are not foreseen 
[but] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, . . . the 
consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action.”). 
125 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (asserting that unforeseen consequences 
of a killing resulting from an unlawful or negligent act makes the person guilty of 
murder). 
126 Aquinas states that, despite the unlawfulness of killing oneself, “[i]t is clear 
that the sign of the greatest love is to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” AQUINAS, 
supra note 6, at 290 (C. 15, L. 2), in commenting on John 15:13: “Greater love than 
this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” 
127 Aquinas states that, despite the unlawfulness of killing the innocent,  
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely 
sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, 
he would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give 
away in alms, what was then necessary to him. 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. 
128 This permission derives from an analogy to the permission to retain one’s 
own life support. Cf. id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. 
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(1) If a killing is not foreseen129 and is not a natural and 
frequent consequence of an act130 and is not a consequence of an 
unlawful or negligent act,131 the act that results in the killing is 
not an act of killing because the killing is not voluntary.132  In 
other words, there are two situations.  The killing is willed, and 
therefore intended, if the agent either knows that the killing will 
occur or should know that it is a natural and frequent 
consequence of his act or knows that he is committing an 
unlawful or negligent act.  In such a case the agent is morally at 
fault.  The killing is not willed, and therefore accidental, if it is 
outside this knowledge of the agent.  In such a case the agent is 
not morally at fault. 
It bears emphasis that the term accidental in this context is 
not what is outside one’s purpose but rather outside one’s 
knowledge.  It is true that in another context, Aquinas states 
that “everything that results in addition to what the cause aims 
to bring about is an accidental, not an intrinsic, effect.”133  In this 
sense of what one causes, an evil effect is always an accidental 
effect because one never has an aim or purpose to do anything 
but good.134  However, in the sense of what one intends, a known 
evil effect is not accidental whether one knows it will happen as 
an end or as a means or as a circumstance.  Intention includes 
 
129 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (regarding unforeseen chance 
happenings). 
130 See id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (“[I]f the consequences are not foreseen 
[but] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, . . . the 
consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action.”). 
131 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (asserting that unforeseen consequences 
of a killing resulting from an unlawful or negligent act makes the person guilty of 
murder). 
132 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684; pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472; see also id. pt. 
II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (“[M]oral acts take their species according to what is 
intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is 
accidental . . . .”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 43, art. 3, at 1368 (“[S]candal is accidental when it 
is beside the agent’s intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate 
deed or word, to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own 
will.”); id. pt. I-II, Q. 72, art. 1, at 902 (asserting that the voluntary act “is referred 
essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such 
matter”). 
133 AQUINAS, ON EVIL, supra note 58, at 70. Aquinas states that  
evil as such cannot be intended, nor in any way willed or desired, since 
being desirable has the nature of good, to which evil as such is contrary . . . 
. [Wherefore] no person does any evil except intending something that 
seems good to the person . . . . [And thus] it seems good to the adulterer 
that he enjoy sense pleasure, and he commits adultery for that reason, 
even though one knows that adultery is wrong. Id. 
134 Id. at 70–71. 
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not only what one aims to do but also what one knows will 
happen as the means by which or the circumstances in which 
that end is accomplished. 
As for means, Aquinas states that “the movement of the will 
to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same 
thing.”135  Thus, Aquinas can say that “it is not lawful for a man 
to intend killing [referring to means] a man in self-defense 
[referring to purpose].”136  It is possible that the killing may not 
be intended directly but rather indirectly inasmuch as intending 
an act which is unlawful or negligent incorporates the killing 
within the intention of the act even without one knowing that the 
killing will happen.  Such cases include what today in human law 
we would call felony murder (unlawful act) and drunk driving 
homicide (negligent act).  In such cases, the killing is unlawful 
because what is intended (i.e., the felony and the driving while 
drunk) is unlawful, and the killing is subsumed within the 
intention of these unlawful acts.137 
As for consequences, Aquinas states that “if [the 
consequences of an action] are foreseen, it is evident that they 
increase the goodness or malice,” and “if the consequences are 
not foreseen . . . [but] they follow from the nature of the action 
and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences 
increase the goodness or malice of that action.”138  In the latter 
case, an agent may not foresee these consequences of his action 
but they follow from its nature and should be known.  In this 
respect, their evil is attributed to the agent’s intention.  
Elizabeth Anscombe correctly comments that if Aquinas does 
have a doctrine on responsibility for evil consequences of actions, 
it is to this passage and not to his discussion of self-defense that 
one should look.139 
(2) If one sacrifices oneself in an act of charitable love, the 
act that results in killing is not an act of killing because the self-
sacrifice does not take one’s life but rather offers it to God in 
charitable love.  Self-sacrifice is not only permitted but is 
praiseworthy because it is the perfection of charity.  Aquinas 
 
135 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 4, at 641–42. 
136 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
137 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472. 
138 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684. 
139 Anscombe, supra note 73, at 24–25; see also AQUINAS, ON EVIL, supra note 
58, at 74 (“[I]f evil is always or in most cases associated with the good intrinsically 
intended, the will is not excused from sin, although the will does not intrinsically 
intend the evil.”). 
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quotes John 15:13 that “Greater love than this no man hath, that 
a man lay down his life for his friends.”140  Killing derogates from 
the gift of life that God gives to each person by taking life when it 
is only God’s to take, but God gives us the example of His Son’s 
love through His passion and death to teach us how to give our 
lives to God in a way that is the direct opposite of killing.  One 
cannot take one’s own life by one’s own hand, but one can submit 
to death caused by another person or force in order to promote 
the common good.  Aquinas states that right reason in accord 
with charity “judges the common good to be better than the good 
of the individual.”141  Charity “seeketh not her own (1 Cor. xiii. 5): 
wherefore the Apostle says of himself (ibid. x. 33): Not seeking 
that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be 
saved.”142  Aquinas states that the perfection of the love of 
neighbor “is shown by the things which man despises for his 
neighbor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods for 
the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even 
death.”143  The perfection of the love of God is martyrdom, which 
“is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as 
being the sign of the greatest charity.”144  On the other hand, 
suicide “is contrary to the inclination of nature and to charity 
whereby every man should love himself,” and therefore it is 
always a mortal sin.145  An example of suicide is when a soldier 
 
140 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1952. See 
also id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1322 (“The common good of many is more 
Godlike than the good of an individual” and therefore “it is a virtuous action for a 
man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal 
common good of his country.”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298. (“[I]f a man of 
his own accord offer himself for [his neighbor’s welfare in a case of urgency], this 
belongs to the perfection of charity.”). Aquinas explains the meaning of laying down 
one’s life for one’s friends in his commentary on John: 
It is clear that the sign of the greatest love is to lay down one’s life for one’s 
friends. This is so because there are four lovable things to be put in order: 
God, our soul, our neighbor, and our body. We should love God more than 
ourselves and our neighbor, so that for the sake of God we ought to give 
ourselves, body and soul, and our neighbor. We should lay down our body, 
but not give it, for the sake of our soul. For our neighbor, we should expose 
our body and our physical life for his salvation. 
AQUINAS, supra note 6, at 290 (C. 15, L. 2). 
141 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 47, art. 10, at 1395. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1952. 
144 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 124, art. 3, at 1717. 
145 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469. Suicide is a selfish act, oftentimes 
committed in order to avoid what one mistakenly considers a greater evil, such as an 
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kills himself by his own hand even if it is to save the lives of his 
comrades, such as in a suicide bombing.  A good example of self-
sacrifice is when a soldier jumps on a grenade to save the lives of 
his comrades—an act that belongs to the perfection of charity.146 
(3) If the only way to save oneself or another is by retaining 
or removing a vital life support from a person who one knows will 
be killed as a result, but the vital life support belongs to the 
person saved (whether oneself or another), the act that results in 
killing is not an act of killing because one may prefer oneself in 
the use of one’s own vital life support.  A vital life support 
consists of such things as food and water to sustain the body 
against hunger and thirst, air to sustain the body against 
suffocation, material support to sustain the body against a fall or 
drowning, and even one’s own body itself.  The key to 
understanding this permission lies in the passage in which 
Aquinas states that 
it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is 
necessary. . . . [so that] if a man found himself in the presence of 
a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient to support himself 
and his children, or others under his charge, he would be 
throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give away 
in alms, what was then necessary to him.147   
This passage must be read in the context of the duty to give alms 
to understand its full meaning. 
There is a duty to give alms.  It exists 
on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident 
and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise—
on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which 
he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with 
probability.148   
Aquinas states that “[t]he temporal goods which God grants us, 
are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they 
belong not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to 
succor out of what we have over and above our needs.”149  Thus, if 
 
unhappy life, the shame of sin, or the fear of consenting to sin. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, 
art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469. 
146 See LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 73–80 for a discussion 
of the difference between these two cases, although Long ascribes the difference to a 
difference in teleological order. 
147 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. 
148 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1328. 
149 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328. Aquinas maintains that “it is lawful for 
man to possess property” although “as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to 
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one owns a vital life support that one does not need but another 
does need, the owner should help out the other by giving the 
support.  In fact, if the other’s need is a matter of life or death, 
the other is even permitted to take the support without it being 
considered a theft and the owner has no right to a return.150  
Aquinas is quite adamant about this duty.  He warns that “in 
such cases the words of Ambrose apply, Feed him that dies of 
hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.”151 
In the context of this duty to give alms, the passage that 
states that “it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is 
necessary” puts a priority on saving oneself over saving another 
when only one can be saved.  There is no duty to give one’s own 
vital life support to another if it is needed for one’s survival, even 
if the other will die as a result.  Aquinas confirms this priority by 
stating that “each one must first of all look after himself and 
then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with 
what remains relieve the needs of others.”152  There is one caveat; 
Aquinas allows for self-sacrifice out of charitable love.  He states 
that the duty to look after oneself and those under one’s charge is 
without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing 
that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a 
great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it 
would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives 
of those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a 
person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s own.153   
Other than this caveat, a person may save himself and his family 
without the act being a killing.  The act differs from a killing 
since one retains one’s own vital life support as opposed to taking 
the other’s vital life support away. 
An extension of this case occurs when two people are in vital 
need of food to survive, and one of them owns only enough food 
for her own survival, and the other steals this food from her.  
This is not a case of inaction where the owner of the food refrains 
 
communicate [external things] to others in their need.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 2, at 
1477. This communication is due from what people have “in superabundance” and 
not from what they need for themselves. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480. 
150 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480–81. 
151 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. This passage should be read for what it 
says. The praiseworthy act is endangering oneself and those under one’s charge in 
this situation; it is not laying down the lives of those under one’s charge, although it 
may rise to the level of laying down one’s own life. 
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from giving the food to the other person, as in the last case.  In 
this case, the owner of the food acts to take her food back.  
Aquinas indicates that the owner of the food may take her food 
back in this case, even though the other’s death is foreseen as a 
result of the act.  Aquinas states that the other person “ought to 
pay what he owes, . . . unless perchance the case be so urgent 
that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property in 
order to relieve the one who is in need,” but then he adds that 
“this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress.”154  
The creditor, who is the owner of the food, is in equal distress in 
this case, and therefore the taking back of the food is not a killing 
of the other person.  This is an act of commutative justice 
whereby the return of the food is due in justice in order to correct 
the imbalance of the thief retaining what is the property of the 
other.155  In one sense this case ultimately becomes one of 
inaction after the imbalance is corrected because the death of the 
other person results from the owner of the food keeping her food. 
So far, the discussion of vital life support has focused on 
support that is owned by one person as against another.  In a 
situation where the vital life support is not owned by either 
person, Aquinas indicates that it may be allocated to one person 
as against the other if a fair method is used to determine who 
gets it.  Aquinas quotes Augustine to say: 
If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him 
who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two 
come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need 
or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than 
in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou 
canst not give to both.156   
 
154 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1322. 
155 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 62, art. 1, at 1455–56. 
156 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1608 (quoting AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA 
CHRISTIANA I, xxviii (397)). A modern example of this case is that of two patients, 
each of whom needs a respirator to survive toxic fumes, but only one respirator is 
available. Neither patient owns the respirator; it is owned by the hospital. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to save both patients with the one respirator. 
Assuming that the hospital uses a fair procedure to allocate the respirator to one of 
the patients, the allocation is permissible without the act being a killing. Aquinas 
states that “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, 
if he does not do what he cannot.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525. Likewise, 
if a father is holding onto his two children who have slipped off a balcony of a high-
rise apartment building but only has the strength to hold onto one of them before 
help arrives, he may let one of the children slip to maintain his grasp on the other as 
long as his choice is fair. See John Makdisi, Justification in the Killing of an 
Innocent Person, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1990). 
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Likewise, if two people own the vital life support in common and 
both need it for survival, they could not act more justly than in 
choosing by lot who shall have the vital life support that can only 
support one of them.  Making a fair choice by an agreement that 
will transfer one’s commonly owned share to the other is a 
prudent method for making the best of a bad situation.  However, 
if the two people who need the vital life support for survival are 
not able to agree on how to make this choice, one cannot make 
the determination on one’s own because it would be attacking a 
vital life support not yet transferred and therefore still owned by 
the other. 
In some situations, although the vital life support is owned 
by one person as against another, Aquinas indicates that the 
owner may be under an obligation to give this support to the 
other, in which case the support is no longer one’s own to retain.  
Aquinas states that in cases of urgency “charity does not 
necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his 
neighbor’s welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation 
to do so; and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that 
purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.”157  Thus, self-
sacrifice is permitted as a charitable act, but it is not required 
unless one is under an obligation to do so, in which case one must 
lay down one’s own life for another.  One example of such an 
obligation is that of a pastor for his flock.  Aquinas states that 
when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal 
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his 
personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some 
temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending 
danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay 
down his life for his sheep.158   
Further on in this passage, Aquinas refers to a helmsman 
immediately after quoting Augustine to say that “[w]hen, 
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need 
of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need.”159  It 
is not clear here that Aquinas is saying that a helmsman owes 
the duty to lay down his life for the people on his vessel, but the 
suggestion is there. 
 
157 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298. 
158 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966. 
159 Id. (quoting AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa 
428)). 
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Does a mother owe a similar duty of care to the baby in her 
womb which requires her to lay down her life for her baby?160  
There is again no clear answer in Aquinas’s work.  A parent does 
have a duty to care for one’s children.161  The duty arises from the 
natural relationship whereby the child “is not distinct from its 
parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s 
womb,”162 and the “parents love their children as being part of 
themselves.”163  This duty can be analogized to the duty of a 
pastor for his flock, although it is not certain how much the 
pastor’s duty stems from his embrace of the state of perfection.164  
It would appear that the duty of a mother should be no less than 
the duty of a helmsman,165 although it is not certain that Aquinas 
would extend the duty of a helmsman beyond mere self-
endangerment to the ultimate sacrifice of his life for the lives of 
his passengers when this extreme situation is a certainty.  On 
the other hand, Aquinas does seem to indicate that the mother’s 
duty of care does not require that she sacrifice her life for the life 
of her child when he states that “each one must first of all look 
after himself and then after those over whom he has charge.”166  
He immediately follows this statement with an analogy to nature 
by stating that “nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it 
requires for the upkeep of one’s own body, and afterwards yields 
 
160 Judith Jarvis Thomson raises this question when she states that 
“[o]pponents of abortion . . . have tended to overlook the possible support they might 
gain from making out that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to establish 
that she has a special kind of responsibility for it.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense 
of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 58 (1971). 
161 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 9, ad. 1, at 1301 (the 
duty “of parents to their children is especially one of care”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 8, 
ad. 2, at 1966 (a man is “bound to support in bodily sustenance” the sons of his 
body). 
162 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 12, at 1223. 
163 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 9, at 1301. 
164 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1966 (“When a man is appointed to a 
bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection.”). 
165 Aquinas states that “we ought out of charity to love those who are more 
closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and 
because there are more reasons for loving them.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 8, at 1300. 
166 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328. Rhonheimer refers to Aquinas’s words in 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, that “one is bound to take more 
care of one’s own life than of another’s,” and affirms that “the natural and morally 
legitimate drive for self-preservation [and] the similarly natural and morally 
indisputable love for self [is such] that no maternal obligation and indeed no duty at 
all can ever render [these] simply morally insignificant.” MARTIN RHONHEIMER, 
VITAL CONFLICTS IN MEDICAL ETHICS: A VIRTUE APPROACH TO CRANIOTOMY AND 
TUBAL PREGNANCIES 117 (William F. Murphy, Jr., ed., 2009). 
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the residue for the formation of another by the power of 
generation.”167  Therefore, it is an open question whether Aquinas 
sees a duty by the mother to give the vital life support of her 
body to her baby when her body can support only one of them.  If 
he sees a duty, then the mother cannot remove the baby from her 
body if the baby’s death is foreseen.  If he sees no duty, then the 
mother can remove the baby from her body when the foreseen 
death of the baby results from the lack of support from the 
mother’s body, but not when the foreseen death of the baby 
results from an attack on a vital life support belonging to the 
baby.168 
On the other hand, the duty of the pastor for his flock, the 
possible duty of the helmsman for his passengers, and the 
possible duty of the mother for her baby exists only as long as the 
fulfillment of that duty is possible.  Aquinas states that “no man 
is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if 
he does not do what he cannot.”169  By way of example, he states 
that “a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he have a suitable 
opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no omission.”170  
Similarly, if a person who is obligated to save another person 
does not have an opportunity to do so, then it would appear that 
the person is not bound to the impossible.  In the case of a pastor, 
Aquinas addressed the question whether a pastor is a hireling 
and not a shepherd “if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, 
a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted 
to his care.”171  Aquinas answers that “he who, in order to avoid 
danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not 
flee as a hireling.”172  If the flock is going to be killed with or 
without his help and there is no other benefit for the flock’s 
salvation that can be accomplished by his staying (such as moral 
 
167 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1327. 
168 I am aware that the Catholic Church through The Holy Office has disallowed 
such a removal. See HENRY DENZINGER, THE SOURCES OF CATHOLIC DOGMA No. 
1890a (Roy J. Deferrari trans., 30th ed., 2002), providing the reply in the negative of 
the Holy Office, approved by Pope Leo XIII, to the Archbishop of Cambrésis, July 24, 
25, 1895, to the question whether a doctor could remove a fetus to save a mother 
from certain and imminent death due to the presence of the fetus in her womb. I do 
not oppose the Church; I accept its teaching. However, the project here is to 
determine what Aquinas would have said if he had been presented with such a case. 
The text is not clear on this issue. 
169 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1523. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, obj. 1, at 1965. 
172 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, ad. 1, at 1966. 
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support against despair), the duty disappears.  Likewise, in the 
case of a helmsman and a mother, where the passengers and the 
baby are certain to die with or without their help, the duty to 
safeguard, if it exists, should disappear.  The helmsman should 
be able to remove himself from steering the vessel and the 
mother should be able to remove herself from sustaining her 
baby, although in no case can either of them attack the vital life 
support belonging to the other in the process. 
(4) If the only way to save oneself or those under one’s charge 
is by ducking, blocking, or redirecting a deadly force even though 
one knows that someone will be killed as a result, the act that 
results in killing is not an act of killing because one may prefer 
oneself and those under one’s charge in avoiding the deadly force.  
This situation is derived by analogy from the passage173 that 
permits the retention of one’s own life support even though it 
results in the death of another.  Both the retaining action and the 
ducking/blocking/redirecting action uses one’s own resources to 
survive against a destructive force.  In the former, the resource is 
the vital life support and the destructive force is hunger, 
drowning, etc.; in the latter, the resource is the guarding of one’s 
life and the destructive force is a moving object.  With both the 
action of retention and the action of ducking/blocking/redirecting, 
another person will die who would not die without the action, but 
the death of the other person is the result of the destructive force 
and not one’s self-initiated action of attack.  Thus, it appears 
appropriate to analogize the case of the one who avoids the 
deadly moving force to the case of the one who retains the vital 
life support and to conclude that both individuals are permitted 
to act despite their knowledge that another will be killed. 
Assuming that the analogy is one that Aquinas would 
condone, a potential objection may still arise from Aquinas’s 
statement that, even if a private individual wants to do 
something for the common good, if it “be harmful to some other, 
it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person 
to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts 
for the welfare of the whole.”174  The action for the common good 
that redirects a deadly moving force to people it would not 
otherwise have harmed appears to be harmful to these other 
 
173 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328. 
174 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1467. The person to whom it pertains to 
decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole is the person 
under public authority. 
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people.  However, by treating this redirection in the same way as 
the retention of one’s own vital life support, Aquinas would not 
attribute the deaths of these other people to the one who controls 
the deadly force but rather to the deadly force itself, since he 
attributes the death that results from retaining one’s food to 
hunger and not to the act of the one retaining the food.  Aquinas 
refuses to attribute causation to one who acts rightfully in 
managing an essential cause of harm.  This is evident when he 
states elsewhere that the death of an innocent person is not 
imputable to a judge in a case where his duty is to pronounce a 
sentence of death in accordance with the evidence (the evidence 
of a guilty verdict) “for it is not he that puts the innocent man to 
death, but they who stated him to be guilty.”175 
In a case where a deadly moving force threatens others’ lives 
and one can control the force to kill fewer people,176 the situation 
is again analogous to one involving a vital life support.  Just as a 
vital life support such as a respirator can be allocated fairly to 
one person even though another will die without it,177 one should 
be able to direct a deadly moving force fairly away from one or 
more persons even though others will die as a result.  Aquinas 
speaks directly to how this should be done when he quotes 
Augustine to say: 
If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as 
to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and 
which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, 
should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far 
as I can see, they must be chosen by lot.178   
The ministers of God have a duty to remain at their post in order 
not to forsake the Church, but not all of them are needed to fulfill 
this duty.  They all face death by persecution unless they flee.  In 
order to determine who goes and who stays, the fair method is to 
draw lots.  Similarly, one should employ a fair method in 
determining how to direct the deadly force so that fewer are 
killed.179  All other things being equal, Aquinas would probably 
 
175 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, ad. 3, at 1470. 
176 One may have control as the designated driver or as a bystander who 
assumes control when the designated driver is incapacitated. 
177 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1607 (quoting 
AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA I xxviii (397)). 
178 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1607 (quoting 
AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa 428)). 
179 What is fair depends on the case. Aquinas states that one must use prudent 
judgment when one must decide who to succor from among one’s family and 
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agree that one should direct the deadly moving force to kill as 
few people as possible.180 
In the case where one’s own life is threatened but one has an 
obligation to safeguard another with his life, the case of 
ducking/blocking/redirecting is yet again analogous to the case of 
retaining a vital life support.  In this case, an obligation to 
safeguard another with one’s life transforms one’s own vital life 
support into a life support belonging to the other.  Thus, if one 
has a duty to save another and is faced with death from a moving 
deadly force, one does not have a right to duck, block, or redirect 
that moving deadly force if sacrificing oneself will save the 
person he has a duty to save.  In the example of the pastor 
above,181 Aquinas specifically states that 
when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal 
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his 
personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some 
temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending 
danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay 
down his life for his sheep.182   
However, as also noted above, this duty should exist only as long 
as the fulfillment of the duty is possible because, as Aquinas 
states, “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man 
sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.”183  When the 
duty disappears, the person in the way of the deadly moving force 
has a right to duck, block, or redirect it in order to survive, even 
with the result of the other person’s death, but in no case may 
the person who avoids the deadly moving force attack the vital 
life support of the other person or remove that other person’s 
ability to duck, block, or redirect the deadly force himself. 
 
strangers because “we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as 
pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with 
us,” but “this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or 
matter in hand.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, at 1322. Aquinas adds that “if of two, one 
be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, 
by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since 
there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires 
the judgment of a prudent man.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 1, at 1322. 
180 When speaking of an injury that one causes to another, Aquinas states that 
“[o]ther things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects 
more persons.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 4, at 1475. 
181 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525. 
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II. CASE APPLICATIONS 
The first Part of this Article examined how and why Aquinas 
prohibits a private individual’s attack on the vital life support of 
some person who he knows will be killed as a result, even though 
it is the only way to save himself or another from death, but 
permits that individual (a) to retain or remove from the person 
killed the vital life support if it belongs to himself or the other 
person saved, and (b) to duck, block, or redirect a deadly force 
away from himself or those under his charge even though 
another person will die as a result of that act.  This second Part 
introduces a number of controversial modern-day cases and 
applies Aquinas’s concept of killing to their solution as a way to 
clarify and enhance understanding of his concept.  It is important 
to keep in mind that this Article addresses only the extreme case 
where one cannot save one’s own life or the life of those under 
one’s charge without another person dying who would otherwise 
have lived.  Therefore, this approach avoids the issue of 
proportionality, concerning which Aquinas states that “though 
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered 
unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end.”184  Also, this 
Article assumes that the death of one or the other person is a 
certainty.  Uncertainty can change a prohibition into a 
permission, such as when Aquinas states that “it [is not] 
necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-
defense in order to avoid killing the other man,” meaning that 
one can defend oneself with moderate  actions that have a chance 
of killing the other man but cannot “intend[] to kill a man in self-
defense.”185 
A. Case of the Craniotomy 
A craniotomy or cutting of the cranium 
is an operation that, at least at some times in the past, was 
thought to be medically indicated when a baby’s head was too 
large to allow normal delivery: instruments could be used to 





184 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. For example, one cannot let another die of 
starvation if one’s own life is not at stake and one has surplus food. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 
32, art. 5, at 1327–28. 
185 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
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allow the child’s removal from the birth canal and the survival 
of the mother who would otherwise perish in childbirth along 
with her child.186   
This is an act that attacks the vital life support of the baby’s body 
and falls squarely within the definition of a prohibited killing for 
Aquinas.  However, John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph 
Boyle argue that the permissibility of bringing about the lethal 
damage to the baby, which is foreseen and voluntarily accepted, 
depends on “whether the killing is brought about as an end 
sought (obviously not) or as a chosen means.”187  Their position 
adopts Boyle’s way of treating a killing in self-defense and 
extends it to a case of non-aggression.  Since the killing is not 
sought as an end, “a doctor could do a craniotomy, even one 
involving the emptying the baby’s skull, without intending to kill 
the baby . . . .”188 
Finnis, Grisez and Boyle attempt to provide a justification in 
Aquinas’s work for defining an intended means as one that is 
sought rather than one foreseen by citing to his discussions on 
discord and drunkenness.189  However, Aquinas does not make a 
distinction in these discussions between a foreseen effect that is 
sought and one that is not; rather, Aquinas distinguishes 
between what is foreseen and what is not.  The sin of discord 
consists in “knowingly and intentionally dissent[ing] from the 
Divine good and [one’s] neighbor’s good, to which [one] ought to 
consent.”190  Yet, “when several intend a good pertaining to God’s 
honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one deems a certain thing 
good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case 
accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our 
neighbor.”191  The accidental and therefore unintended aspect of 
the act, which removes sin from the act (barring error or undue 
obstinacy), arises from the fact that it is not foreseen.  Likewise, 
the sin of drunkenness consists in “willingly and knowingly 
 
186 John Finnis, Germain Grisez & Joseph Boyle, “Direct” and “Indirect”: A 
Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory, 65 THOMIST 1, 21 (2001). These operations are 
no longer necessary in most medical environments because a caesarean section can 
be performed to save both mother and child. 
187 Id. at 24 (emphasis in the original). 
188 Id. at 27; accord WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE GIFT OF 
HUMAN LIFE 191–94 (3d ed., 2013). 
189 See Finnis, Grisez & Boyle, supra note 186, at 19 n.29 (citing SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt II-II, Q. 37, art. 1, at 1352 (discord) and pt. II-II, Q. 
150, art. 2, at 1800 (drunkenness)). 
190 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 37, art. 1, at 1352. 
191 Id. 
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depriv[ing] [one]self of the use of reason.”192  Yet, when one 
“knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating,” the 
drunkenness occurs “accidentally and beside the intention.”193  
The accidental and therefore unintended aspect of the act, which 
removes the sin from the act, arises from the fact that it is not 
foreseen.  Therefore, Aquinas indicates a contrary conclusion to 
that of Finnis, Grisez and Boyle.  A craniotomy, which is the 
knowing—and therefore intended—killing of an innocent person 
as a means to saving the life of the mother, is wrongful because 
“it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.”194 
Rhonheimer offers another perspective on the moral quality 
of the act of craniotomy.  He justifies the crushing of the child’s 
skull on the basis that “the obstetric intervention with the 
consequence of the direct death of the fetus cannot be described 
as an act of killing that infringes on justice.”195  The reason is 
that “[o]ne cannot ‘take away’ a life for which it is already clear 
that it will never even be born.”196  In saying this, Rhonheimer 
does not deny the sacredness of life after conception; his point is 
that one is not taking away a life in this situation when it is on 
the verge of dying.197  Rhonheimer recognizes that there is still a 
very short time span in which the child would otherwise live, but 





192 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 150, art. 2, at 1800. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. Aquinas does not speak directly to the 
prohibition of killing a fetus to save the mother, but he does speak directly to the 
prohibition of killing a mother to save the child. In an article where he affirms that 
one cannot baptize a child while it is still in the womb, he considers whether, in the 
case of a child who will die in the womb and cannot be baptized, “it would be better 
for the mother to be opened, and the child to be taken out by force and baptized, 
than that the child should be eternally damned through dying without Baptism.” See 
id. pt. III, Q. 68, art. 11, obj. 3, at 2407. Aquinas answers that “it is wrong to kill a 
mother that her child may be baptized.” See id. pt. III, Q. 68, art. 11, ad. 3, at 2407. 
195 RHONHEIMER, supra note 166, at 123. 
196 Id. 
197 He claims that the “[k]illing as a morally reprehensible act—i.e., more 
precisely as a violation of justice—is not even an issue,” and the act “can be 
described and judged to be morally right as an act of saving a life . . . .” Id. at 13. 
198 Rhonheimer states that “by the craniotomy the baby’s life will be somewhat 
(but insignificantly) abbreviated.” Martin Rhonheimer, Vital Conflicts, Direct 
Killing, and Justice: A Response to Rev. Benedict Guevin and Other Critics, 11 NAT’L 
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 519, 532 (2011). 
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Rhonheimer, the killing of the child is beside the intention 
inasmuch as the killing does not have the moral quality of 
injustice.199 
Rhonheimer’s perspective on the moral quality of the act of 
craniotomy fails to appreciate that for Aquinas the act of 
injustice in taking a life is not affected by the quality of that life 
but rather by the fact that one exercises dominion over the life of 
a human person—a dominion that lies only in God’s authority.  
To usurp this authority is an act of injustice against God no 
matter what the state of the life of the person killed.  It is not the 
fact that the fetus has only a short time to live, but the fact that 
the fetus is a living person, that is relevant when the act of 
crushing its skull removes that life.  To illustrate that there is no 
injustice, Rhonheimer states that, if the child could think and 
send a message to its mother, he thinks that the fetus would ask 
her to let the physician perform the craniotomy.200  However, this 
act by the fetus to take its own life would itself be suicide, the 
taking of one’s own life to produce a good.  The physician may not 
act on this request any more than on the request of a son who 
asks the physician to remove his heart at the cost of his own life 
so that his mother may receive it as a transplant to save hers.  
This is not an act of self-sacrifice by the fetus whereby it dies in 
the act of saving by a force other than his own hand, but even if it 
were, the mother cannot make this decision for the fetus since 
the act of self-sacrifice is a purely gratuitous act which can be 
accomplished only by the consent of the giver.  A fetus does not 
have the ability to give such consent.  Therefore, contrary to 
Rhonheimer’s argument, the killing of the child is intended and 
does have the quality of injustice so as to make it a prohibited 
act.201 
 
199 Rhonheimer makes a similar argument for the case where “the only exit from 
a cave in which a group of spelunkers are trapped is a small passageway in which an 
obese participant in the expedition has become stuck.” RHONHEIMER, supra note 
166, at 43. The spelunkers are in danger of drowning as the water level rises unless 
they leave the cave, and the only way to leave the cave is to dynamite the 
passageway, killing the obese participant in the process. Rhonheimer says that in 
this situation “it makes little sense to say that those who blew open the 
passageway—along with the obese participant who was stuck in it—assumed the 
role of judge over life and death . . . .” Therefore, it is a permitted act since it falls 
outside the ethical framework of justice. Id. 
200 Rhonheimer, supra note 198, at 528. 
201 Likewise, pace Rhonheimer, the spelunkers who killed an obese participant 
when they dynamited a wall to escape death did assume “the role of judge over life 
and death,” and the killing is prohibited as a violation of justice. 
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B. Case of the Cancerous Uterus 
In contrast to the illicit act of craniotomy, a hysterectomy 
that removes a cancerous uterus from a pregnant mother who 
would otherwise die, appears to be a permitted act for Aquinas 
even though the fetus within the uterus should die from lack of 
sustenance.  In this case, if the mother does not owe a duty to lay 
down her life for her baby’s life, she does not kill the fetus any 
more than when one retains one’s own food for survival instead of 
giving it to another who needs it for survival.202  The mother 
retains the vital life support of her own body by the removal of 
the diseased uterus.  The act is permissible even though a 
necessary result of this act is the death of the fetus from the loss 
of the vital life support of the mother’s body.  The reason is that, 
barring a duty to lay down her life for her baby, a mother’s vital 
life support belongs to her and, when it can save only one of two 
people, she has a right to prefer herself.203  Contrary to the case 
of the craniotomy, the killing does not occur by attacking the 
integrity of the body of the fetus;  it occurs by withdrawing the 
support of the mother’s body as her own vital life support from 
the baby.  In the absence of a duty to save, this act is permitted.  
In the presence of a duty to save, the mother cannot withdraw 
this support unless the baby is going to die anyway, in which 
case the fulfillment of her duty is impossible, and the duty 
disappears.204 
 
202 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328, where 
Aquinas states that “each one must first of all look after himself and then after those 
over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of 
others.” 
203 Note that one cannot make the argument that the fetus is treated as a 
member of the mother’s body in this regard. The uterus corrupts the mother’s body 
threatening death, and, if the mother were not pregnant, it would be “lawful with 
the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of 
the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare.” See id. 
pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 1, at 1473. Furthermore, Aquinas states that a child “is not 
distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s 
womb.” See id. pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 12, at 1223. However, a child is distinct as to its 
personhood, since a person is the result of the union of body and soul whereby the 
soul animates the body while it is in the womb of the mother. See id. pt. I, Q. 3, art. 
1, at 16; pt. I, Q. 118, art. 2, ad. 2, at 575; id. pt. III, Q. 2, art. 5, ad. 1, at 2037–38. 
Therefore, while the fetus can be compared to a member of the mother’s body insofar 
as the mother has control over it, it cannot be destroyed in the way that the mother 
can destroy a decaying member of her body. 
204 On a side note, the Catholic Church has approved the removal of a cancerous 
uterus even if a fetus dies as a result. ODILE M. LIEBARD, LOVE AND SEXUALITY 126 
(1978) (quoting POPE PIUS XII, ADDRESS OF POPE PIUS XII TO THE ASSOCIATIONS OF 
THE LARGE FAMILIES (Nov. 26, 1951)), states that if 
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The removal of a cancerous uterus is not the same as 
radiation therapy to treat cancer in the uterus.  Radiation 
therapy attacks the bodily integrity of the fetus.  If it is foreseen 
to cause the death of the fetus, then it is prohibited because it 
would be an act of killing the fetus.  Radiation therapy stands in 
contrast to the hysterectomy, which does not attack the bodily 
integrity of the fetus but rather removes the fetus from the 
support of the mother’s body over which the mother has mastery 
(in the absence of a duty to the fetus) and which the mother can 
use to save herself.205 
 
the safety of the future mother, independently of her state of pregnancy, 
might call for an urgent surgical operation, or any other therapeutic 
application, which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way 
desired or intended, but inevitable, the death of the foetus, such an act 
could not be called a direct attempt on the innocent life. 
In such a case, the Pope says, “the operation can be lawful, as can other similar 
medical interventions, provided that it be a matter of great importance, such as life, 
and that it is not possible to postpone it till the birth of the child, or to have recourse 
to any other efficacious remedy.” Id. at 126–27. 
205 This difference is emphasized by John Di Camillo who considers the case of a 
six-week pregnant woman diagnosed with a life-threatening condition of peripartum 
cardiomyopathy complicated by pregnancy. The threat comes from the interaction of 
a normal functioning placenta with the mother’s weakened heart. The threat is not 
present without the placenta-derived hormones, and it subsides with the separation 
of the placenta from the uterus, which stops the flow of hormones to the mother. Di 
Camillo quotes with approval the following statement from A Colloquium Organized 
by Ascension Health, Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal-Fetal Vital 
Conflicts: A Statement of Consensus, 14 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 477, 488 (2014), 
to which he is one of the signatories: 
‘[M]edical induction of labor prior to fetal viability, when necessary to 
eliminate a grave and present danger posed by a pathological and life-
threatening condition resulting from the interaction of a normally 
functioning placenta with the diseased and weakened heart of the mother, 
is consistent with Directive 47, with Church teaching, and with the 
Catholic moral tradition’ . . . . even though there is moral certitude that the 
child will die immediately upon delivery or shortly thereafter. 
John A. Di Camillo, Commentary, Induction of Labor and Vital Conflicts, 40 ETHICS 
& MEDICS 1 (2015). Di Camillo points out that the induction is not a direct 
destruction of the life of the fetus, which would be a prohibited abortion. Id. at 2. 
However, he does not argue, as does this Article, that the liceity of the mother’s act 
derives from the mastery she has over her own body allowing her to remove the fetus 
from its support when it is a matter of saving her own life. Rather, he adopts the 
reasoning of the Consensus that 
the principle of double effect, as it has been taught in the Catholic moral 
tradition, provides the appropriate framework of moral reasoning to assess 
the moral status of interventions in PPCM+P . . . . Thus, interventions for 
PPCM+P in which the death of the child is not the chosen end or the means 
for causing the good effect of saving the mother’s life, but is rather a 
foreseen but unintended side effect of an action that of itself is immediately 
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C. Case of the Ectopic Pregnancy 
An ectopic pregnancy is one in which the embryo implants 
itself outside the uterus, usually in the fallopian tube.  The 
embryo cannot survive this situation, and usually if there is no 
treatment, the mother will die upon the rupture of the fallopian 
tube.  There are various methods for treating an ectopic 
pregnancy to save the life of the mother.  In a salpingectomy, the 
part of the tube containing the embryo is removed; in a 
salpingotomy (or salpingostomy), the embryo is removed from the 
tube; and in a drug treatment with methotrexate, a chemical 
treatment of the trophoblast surrounding the embryo causes the 
death and expulsion of the embryo.206 
The moral permissibility of these treatments depends on 
much the same reasoning from Aquinas’s texts as that given 
above for the hysterectomy and the cancerous uterus.  If the act 
of killing does not occur by one’s attacking the integrity of the 
embryo but rather by one’s removing one’s own body from the 
support of the embryo in order to save oneself, the act should be 
licit.  Even if the mother has a duty to save the embryo, it is 
impossible to do so and the duty disappears.  One can prefer 
oneself to others in the use of one’s resources and one’s body.  
Therefore, the salpingectomy should be licit as long as the 
 
directed at curing the mother, would be consistent with directive 47 and 
therefore permissible. 
Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal-Fetal Vital Conflicts, supra, at 484-85. 
 The Phoenix Hospital case of a pregnant woman with severe pulmonary 
hypertension who underwent a dilation and curettage procedure that ended her 
pregnancy to save her life in November 2009 is similar to the case discussed above, 
but it is not clear that the procedure in the Phoenix case avoided harming the child 
directly and thereby killing the fetus. See M. Therese Lysaught, Moral Analysis of 
Procedure at Phoenix Hospital, 40 ORIGINS 537, 547 (2011), for this ambiguity. The 
National Catholic Bioethics Center properly rejects such a procedure insofar as it 
involves “the destruction of the child by crushing or dismembering it.” National 
Catholic Bioethics Center, Commentary on the Phoenix Hospital Situation, 40 
ORIGINS 549, 550 (2011). Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco states that in the Phoenix 
Hospital case “the deliberate removal of the unborn child’s healthy placenta prior to 
viability was an act that directly led to the death of the child in the same way as the 
deliberate removal of any adult’s healthy heart without any cardiac replacement 
directly leads to his death.” Nicanor, Pier Girogio Austriaco, Abortion in a Case of 
Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: A Test Case for Two Rival Theories of Human 
Action, 11 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 503, 508 (2011). Austriaco believes that the 
placentectomy was “a direct attack upon the vital organs of the fetus that is ordered 
toward his death.” Id. at 509. 
206 RHONHEIMER, supra note 166, at 90–91. A salpingotomy is similar to a 
salpingostomy with the distinction that the incision is sewn up in the former and not 
in the latter. Id. at 90 n.7. 
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procedure results in the death of the embryo from a lack of 
sustenance from the mother’s body and not from an attack on the 
embryo’s bodily integrity.  The salpingotomy is problematic 
because in the direct removal of the embryo it is possible that the 
instruments of removal could attack the integrity of the body of 
the embryo causing its death before it dies from lack of 
sustenance.207  However, if the intent is to remove the embryo in 
such a way that its bodily integrity is not impaired and there is a 
good chance that this can be done, the operation should be licit.208  
The treatment by methotrexate should be prohibited because it 
“interferes with the nucleic acid synthesis (DNA and RNA) of 
rapidly multiplying cells such as trophoblastic cells and also the 
blastomeres, the cells of the embryo proper which are also 
rapidly dividing by mitosis.”209  Not only do the blastomeres 
belong to the embryo, but the trophoblastic cells appear to belong 
to the embryo as well.210  Therefore, an interference with these 
cells, which itself causes the death of the embryo, should be 
illicit.211 
 
207 See Samuel E. Hager, Against Salpingostomy as a Treatment for Ectopic 
Pregnancy, 16 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 39, 43 (2016) (arguing that a 
salpingostomy often involves an invasion of the bodily integrity of the embryo with 
laparoscopic tools and, at best, is a cutting of the trophoblast). If the cutting of the 
trophoblast is what causes the death of the embryo and not the stopping of life 
support from the mother, then this cutting would be an invasion of the bodily 
integrity of the embryo that would constitute a prohibited killing. 
208 In 1980, an embryo was even successfully removed and implanted in the 
uterus where it went to term and was delivered as a normal infant. Christopher 
Kaczor, The Ethics of Ectopic Pregnancy: A Critical Reconsideration of 
Salpingostomy and Methotrexate, 76 LINACRE Q. 265, 268 (2009) (quoting Landrum 
B. Shettles, Tubal Embryo Successfully Transferred in Utero, 163 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 1771, 2026 (1990)). Of course, if implantation in the uterus is 
possible to save the life of the fetus, then one must do so to avoid killing the fetus. 
For arguments in favor of “abortion as removal” as opposed to “abortion as killing” in 
the case of a salpingostomy, see id. at 267–72; MAY, supra, note 188, at 196. 
209 Marie Anderson et al., Ectopic Pregnancy and Catholic Morality: A Response 
to Recent Arguments in Favor of Salpingostomy and Methotrexate, 11 NAT’L CATH. 
BIOETHICS Q. 65, 69 (2011). 
210 “The trophoblast is a layer covering the blastocyst that erodes the uterine 
mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother.  The 
trophoblast differentiates into an outer layer called a syncytiotrophoblast and an 
inner layer called the cytotrophoblast. The origin of the DNA within the cells of the 
trophoblast is the embryo—not the mother.” Id. at 671 n.22. See Maria T. DeGoede, 
An Argument Against the Use of Methotrexate in Ectopic Pregnancies, 14 NAT’L 
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 625, 630–32 (2014), for an argument that the trophoblast 
should be considered an organ of the embryo. 
211 Helen Watt maintains that “however short the child’s life will be, to invade 
the child’s body (including the placenta and amniotic sac) in a foreseeably, seriously, 
and exclusively harmful way seems incompatible with respect for the bodily 
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D. Case of the Violinist 
The cases of hysterectomy and ectopic pregnancy illustrate 
situations where the mother withdraws the use of her body from 
the embryo in order to save herself.  The case of the violinist 
illustrates a similar situation where one withdraws the use of 
one’s body in order to save oneself, but in this case, there is 
clearly no duty to safeguard.  The case was originally described 
by Judith Jarvis Thomson in a scenario that did not include any 
threat to one’s life.  As she described it, a violinist with a fatal 
kidney ailment is hooked up to your body for nine months as the 
only way to cure him, and to unplug him before the nine months 
has elapsed would be to kill him.  Thomson asks whether it is 
“morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation.”212  If one 
adds to this fact situation that the hookup will cause your own 
death, the case falls within the category of extreme cases 
examined in this Article.  In accord with Aquinas’s texts, you can 
withdraw the violinist from the use of the vital life support of 
your body, just as a mother (without a duty) can withdraw a 
cancerous uterus containing a fetus from hers.  The only 
difference is that the violinist is a trespasser as opposed to the 
fetus; therefore, there clearly is no duty to lay down one’s life for 
the violinist.  This does not mean that you can kill the violinist 
by an attack on his bodily integrity, but it is permissible to 
deprive him of the support of your body, which is needed to save 




integrity of that child.” Helen Watt, Bodily Invasions: When Side Effects Are Morally 
Conclusive, 11 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 49, 51 (2011). See Kaczor, supra note 208, 
at 272–79 (discussing the debate among several ethicists over the moral implications 
of the use of methotrexate in ectopic pregnancies). 
212 Thomson, supra note 160, at 49. 
213 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328 
(justifying keeping one’s own support when it is a necessity). Thomson makes the 
point that a woman should be able to abort her baby to save her own life because it 
is her body. Thomson, supra note 160, at 52–54. However, she makes no distinction 
between an abortion procedure that attacks and kills the baby itself and an abortion 
procedure that merely removes the baby from the womb. This distinction makes all 
the difference for Aquinas when he justifies keeping one’s own support. 
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E. Case of the Overloaded Boat 
In the case of Holmes v. United States,214 the court instructed 
the jury that, in the case of a life or death situation, a seaman 
who is charged with the safety of passengers in a boat has a duty 
not to sacrifice his passengers by throwing them off an 
overloaded boat even if it means that he loses his own life.  The 
jury subsequently found that the seaman on trial who threw a 
passenger overboard to prevent the boat from sinking was guilty 
of manslaughter.215  The issue for the court involved the duty of 
an individual to control a deadly force under the human law of 
the jurisdiction; however, the seaman’s obligation as determined 
by the court may also be his obligation morally according to 
Aquinas.  Aquinas states that “charity does not necessarily 
require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, 
except in a case where he is under obligation to do so.”216  Some 
evidence that the obligation to imperil himself is the same as 
that determined by the court appears in Aquinas’s reference to a 
helmsman when he quotes Augustine to say that “[w]hen, 
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need 
of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need.”217  If 
it is such an obligation, Aquinas would reach the same conclusion 
morally as the court did legally—namely, that the seaman was 
obliged to put the lives of his passengers above his own and to 
sacrifice himself before he sacrificed their lives. 
The court’s instructions in Holmes also discuss the situation 
of people on a boat who are on equal terms with no duty to save 
each other.  The court states that some of these people can be 
cast off the boat to save the rest from drowning, but it must be 
done fairly, such as by drawing lots.218  Aquinas would agree with 
this approach.219  Likewise, in this case, where the people who 
 
214 Holmes v. United States, 26 F. Cas. 360, 366–67 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 
15,383). 
215 Id. at 368. 
216 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298. 
217 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966 (quoting AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO 
HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa 428)). 
218 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367. The court supported its position by stating that 
“all writers have prescribed the same rule” that “[w]hen the ship is in no danger of 
sinking, but all sustenance is exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to 
appease the hunger of others, the selection is by lot . . . as the fairest mode.” Id. 
However, to kill a person to eat him in appeasement of one’s hunger is an attack on 
the bodily integrity of the victim and thus a prohibited killing. 
219 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1608 (quoting 
AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA I, xxviii (397)). 
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need the boat for survival have an equal claim on it, they could 
not act more justly than in choosing by lot who shall have the 
vital life support that can only support some of them.220  Once the 
determination is made, those who win the choice should be able 
to use the boat to the exclusion of the others even if it means 
casting them overboard to their death by drowning.  The act is 
not an attack on the integrity of their persons221 by taking their 
vital life support because the determination by lots transfers 
their vital life support to the winners of the lottery.222 
 
220 If all the passengers on the boat are equal in their claim to the support of the 
boat, the only way a lottery will work is if a sufficient number are willing to 
participate in it because one cannot be forced to give up one’s right to stay on the 
boat. On the other hand, if the boat is owned by the captain and the passengers 
enjoy only a license to be on the boat, the captain has a right to determine who will 
stay and who will be thrown off—in much the same way as a hospital may determine 
who will get a respirator. The decision must still be fair, but it does not depend on 
the consent of the passengers. Such a case might be that of a submarine that is 
owned by the captain and about to be bombed. There is a crew member still on deck 
who needs time to make it back inside the submarine before it submerges, or he will 
die by drowning. However, the time needed for the crew member to make it back is 
the time during which the submarine would be bombed and destroyed. The captain 
would have a right to withdraw the life support of the submarine he owns to save 
himself and the rest of the crew. This example is discussed in LONG, TELEOLOGICAL 
GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 93–95, where Steven Long argues for the legitimacy of 
an immediate dive, although his reasoning is based on the teleological order of the 
act to its end of saving rather than on the right of the owner to withdraw the vital 
life support of the boat. 
221 This case should be distinguished from that of a man and child in a small 
horse-drawn vehicle whose driver is trying to elude ferocious beasts that he cannot 
outdistance unless one of the passengers is fed to the beasts to slow them down. 
Rollin M. Perkins, Impelled Perpetration Restated, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 406 (1981). 
Perkins states that “the saving of two at the expense of one, all else being equal, 
would be morally right,” except for the fact that the man could have sacrificed 
himself, and therefore by his choice to kill the child “he has no excuse at common 
law.” Id. Aquinas would accept the man’s self-sacrifice as a charitable act of love, 
but, even if the man were not able to sacrifice himself because he was stuck in the 
vehicle, Aquinas would not permit him to throw the child out. This is not a case of 
retaining a vital life support but rather of using another person to stop the deadly 
force. As such, it is an attack on the integrity of the person and constitutes a 
prohibited killing. Similarly, if one’s survival on a boat required killing a person to 
eat him, the act would be an attack on the integrity of the person and a prohibited 
killing. A little over forty years after Holmes, an English court considered such a 
case when a seaman killed and, together with his comrades, ate a young boy as they 
all faced death from a lack of food and water on a boat at sea. The court judged the 
act to be murder. See generally R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 QBD 273 (DC) 
(Eng.). 
222 Of course, one may act with charitable love and sacrifice oneself to save 
another from being cast overboard.  This is the perfection of charity by despising 
death for one’s neighbor’s sake. According to John 15:13, “ ‘Greater love than this no 
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.’ ” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra 
note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1946. 
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In contrast to the case of the overloaded boat, if one is 
stranded at sea on one’s own boat,223 which can only support one 
person, and another person is drowning beside the boat, the right 
to support of the boat is already in the hands of the boat owner.  
No lots need be drawn to determine the ownership.  The owner 
does not kill by letting the other die if the only way to save that 
other person will result in the owner’s own death.  It is wrong for 
the person in the water to take the boat away from its owner,224 
and, if he does take it away, the boat owner may take back the 
boat as may the owner of the food in Aquinas’s example.225  The 
act of return, which is due in commutative justice, returns the 
situation rightly to what it was before, and the death of the 
person in the water is not a killing because it results from the 
retention of the owner’s vital life support.226 
 
 
223 The boat owner may have obtained ownership by title or by prior possession. 
In other words, even if a person merely found a boat in the water and took 
possession of it, he would be considered the owner as against all others except the 
true owner. Aquinas states that “if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, 
and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft.” 
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 5, ad. 2, at 1473. 
224 As early as the beginning of the fourth century, one of the early Church 
Fathers remarks on the injustice of the drowning person taking a plank from one 
who has already seized it. Lactantius advocates the just act even when it appears 
foolish and states:  
What, then, will the just man do, if he shall happen to have suffered 
shipwreck, and some one weaker than himself shall have seized a 
plank? . . . [I]f he choose rather to die than to inflict violence upon another, 
in this case he is just, but foolish, in not sparing his own life while he 
spares the life of another. 
LACTANTIUS, supra note 97, at V, 17, in 7 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 95, at 
152. Likewise in that same century, Ambrose answers the question “whether a wise 
man ought in case of a shipwreck to take away a plank from an ignorant sailor” by 
saying that “[a]lthough it seems better for the common good that a wise man rather 
than a fool should escape from shipwreck, yet I do not think that a Christian, a just 
and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another.” AMBROSE, supra 
note 89, at III, 4.27, in 10 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 89, at 71. 
225 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328, for the 
food case. 
226 Of course, if the owner of the boat cannot get the trespasser off the boat 
except by attacking his vital life support, such as killing him with a gun, he has a 
problem. He is not permitted to attack the vital life support of another person, even 
a trespasser, and must suffer the result of death, if need be, just as in the case of 
self-defense against an aggressor. 
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F. Case of the Avoider 
If one ducks an oncoming deadly force, the act is permitted 
even if the ducker knows that a person behind him will be killed 
as a result.  By analogy to Aquinas’s passage227 where one may 
retain one’s own food for survival even if the retention results in 
the death of another, one may avoid a deadly moving force by 
ducking it.  The death of the other person is the result of the 
destructive force and not the removal of oneself from its path.  
Alison McIntyre offers an interesting variation on this case.228  
Arnold and Bill are on a trolley track in a tunnel with a runaway 
trolley bearing down on them.  They cannot jump aside because 
the tunnel is too narrow, and they cannot outrun the trolley.  If 
the trolley hits one of them, it will stop, but there is no other way 
to stop it.  Bill can outrun Arnold.  McIntyre explains that Bill’s 
outrunning Arnold is a case of negative agency (allowing the 
trolley to hit Arnold as opposed to causing the trolley to hit 
Arnold) and it is “allowable because the cost of preventing it—
self-sacrifice—would be too high.”229  By analogy to Aquinas’s 
case230 of the retention of one’s own food for survival, one might 
rather explain that a person is not obliged to give up one’s own 
right to protect oneself from a deadly force when that protection 
is needed for one’s survival even though another will die from 
that force because one has a right to prefer oneself.231 
Likewise, if one deflects an oncoming deadly force, the act is 
permitted even if the deflector knows that a person in the path of 
the deflection will be killed as a result.  As in the case of ducking, 
one is not obliged to give up one’s own right to protect oneself 
when that protection is needed for one’s survival; the death of the 
other person is the result of the destructive force and not of the 
removal of oneself from its path.  For example, if a person falling 
from a cliff towards your deck will kill you by his fall even though 
he will be saved, it is permissible to deflect his fall by shifting the 
position of your awning even though you know he will be killed 
 
227 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328. 
228 McIntyre, supra note 40, at 252–54 
229 Id. The names, Arnold and Bill, have been added. McIntyre gives this as one 
of several examples where the doctrine of double effect does not solve the problem. 
230 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328. 
231 This case should be distinguished from one who ducks behind another to 
avoid a heat-seeking missile, because such an act uses the other as a shield, thus 
attacking the integrity of that person and constituting a prohibited killing. 
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as a result.232  On the other hand, if you are holding a flagpole on 
your deck and look up to see a person falling towards you who 
will be impaled on the pole if you do not move it (saving you and 
killing him) but will be saved if you do move it (killing you), it is 
not permissible to continue holding the pole.233  In the flagpole 
case the act of self-defense is not a deflection resulting in the 
death of the other person by the force of the fall, but rather an 
attack on the integrity of the falling person’s life by impaling him 
on the pole. 
G. Case of the Mountain Climber 
In the case of ectopic pregnancy where both the mother and 
the embryo face death, the mother is permitted to remove the 
vital support of her body from the embryo to save herself.  A 
somewhat similar case is that of two mountain climbers using 
the same rope to climb the side of a cliff.  The lower climber loses 
his footing and is now dangling in a way that he cannot pull 
himself up nor be pulled up.  The stay that is supporting both of 
them is giving way and it is certain that both will fall to their 
deaths if the weight of the lower climber is not removed from the 
rope.234  Yet despite their similarity, Aquinas would treat them 
differently.  In the ectopic pregnancy case, the mother is 
permitted to remove the support of her own body as a vital life 
support belonging to her; in the mountain climber case, both 
climbers share ownership of the vital support of the rope.  
Therefore, if the lower climber is unwilling to sacrifice himself at 
this point even though he sees that the result will be the death of 
both climbers when the stay gives way, the higher climber is not 
permitted to cut the rope.  If he does so, he attacks the integrity 
of the life of the lower climber by attacking his vital life support.  
Note that in this case it makes no sense for the two climbers to 






232 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 287 
(1991), for the example. 
233 See Whitley Kaufman, Self-Defense, Innocent Aggressors, and the Duty of 
Martyrdom, 91 PAC. PHIL. Q. 78, 80 (2010), for the example. 
234 This classic case appears often in the literature. See, e.g., LONG, 
TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 72-73; Perkins, supra note 221, at 406. 
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because the lower climber would not benefit from such a bargain.  
The only way that the higher climber will be saved is if the lower 
climber is willing to sacrifice himself.235 
H. Case of the Conjoined Twins 
In some situations, it is difficult to determine who has a 
right to that which gives needed life support.  Consider the case 
where twins, Amy and Barbara, are born conjoined at the 
abdomen.236  Amy, whose body does not have a heart, shares a 
common artery with Barbara, which enables her blood to be 
oxygenated through the heart in Barbara’s body.  Neither will 
survive if the two are not separated, but if they are separated 
Amy will die.  If the heart in Barbara’s body belongs to Barbara, 
she may withdraw the support of her own heart from Amy 
without killing her because, according to Aquinas, one can prefer 
oneself to another in the use of one’s body.237  However, why 
should the location of the heart within Barbara’s body make it 
Barbara’s heart?  The twins were formed from the same fertilized 
egg and developed with the same heart providing life support for 
both.238  If the heart belongs to both, then Barbara may not 
unilaterally withdraw the support of the heart from Amy without 
killing her because the heart is not hers to withdraw.  If Amy is 
 
235 The prohibition against cutting the rope would also exist if the lower climber 
were unconscious, unless before he became unconscious he expressed his desire to be 
cut off the rope either expressly or by consent to an implicit code of mountain 
climbers that permits cutting the rope. See Kaufman, supra note 233, at 91. 
236 This hypothetical case is based on Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical 
Treatment) No.1, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721, 726 (U.K). 
237 Steven Long makes a similar argument where he comments on the same 
hypothetical case, using the actual children’s pseudonyms, Jodie and Mary, to say 
that “since the heart and lungs belong to Jodie, and since they are needed by Jodie 
to live, and no other being has a naturally just claim on their use, the confinement of 
their use to Jodie and no one else need involve no positive choice to harm another.” 
LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 118. Grisez thinks the surgery to 
separate the twins “could be morally acceptable in a case in which, without it, both 
children probably would soon die, while with it one of them probably would survive 
indefinitely.” GERMAIN GRISEZ, Difficult Moral Questions, in THE WAY OF THE LORD 
JESUS 3, 292 (1997). However, his reasoning is based on the doctrine of double effect, 
which teaches that there is no intentional killing of the weaker baby because “her 
death was an effect of chosen means that in no way contributed to the end sought.” 
Id. at 291. 
238 One argument that might be made for Barbara’s ownership of the heart is 
that the heart within her body is like a fixture. A fixture is owned by the owner of 
the land to which it is affixed, and the heart could be considered analogously to be 
affixed to and thus owned by the person whose body contains it. However, Aquinas 
does not address this issue. 
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old enough to understand, she may sacrifice herself in charitable 
love to save her sister by giving up the vital life support of the 
heart to her sister.239  Otherwise, there is no recourse to save 
Barbara. 
I. Case of the Human Obstacle 
If an aggressor uses another person to shield himself and the 
only way to stop the aggressor is by knowingly killing the human 
shield, the act is prohibited for the same reason that Aquinas 
prohibits killing the aggressor himself.  One may not attack the 
vital life support of another person.  Likewise, if a person is stuck 
in the mouth of a cave, trapping others in the cave behind him as 
rising water is about to drown them all, no one may use 
dynamite to create an escape route if one knows that the 
dynamite will kill the person who is stuck, even if this is the only 
way to save the people who cannot otherwise escape.240  The 
dynamite attacks the integrity of the person who is stuck.  Even 
the person stuck in the cave cannot blow himself up because it is 
not an act of charitable love to attack one’s own integrity of life.  
To blow oneself up is suicide, as in the case of a suicide bomber.  
Suicide differs from the case of the conjoined twin who separates 
herself from a heart belonging to her sister because in the 
conjoined sister case the death that ensues is caused by the lack 
of a vital support belonging to the sister, whereas in the suicide 
case the death that ensues is caused by one’s own self-initiated 
destruction of one’s own vital life support. 
Similar to this case is the case where five patients are each 
dying from organ failure and the only way to save their lives is to 
kill a sixth person who can supply all their organs.  This act is 
prohibited even if the sixth person consents to being killed.  
Similarly, if an aggressor holds several people hostage and 
claims convincingly that he will kill all of them unless one of 
them kills himself or one of the other hostages, a hostage is 
 
239 If Amy is not old enough to understand, her guardian cannot make this 
decision for her. A decision to sacrifice oneself can never be made by another person 
because it is an act of love, which springs from the heart of the lover, not from a 
surrogate. This is in contrast to the decision of a guardian to have a minor in her 
charge participate in a lottery as in the case of the overloaded boat. In the case of the 
lottery, one bargains for a chance to stay on the boat by offering a chance to be cast 
off. This is essentially a bargain beneficial to the minor for an exchange of 
ownership, and the guardian may act in the best interest of her charge. 
240 See Foot, supra note 40, at 6 (presenting this problem). 
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prohibited from killing himself or another hostage.241  It is the act 
of killing by attacking the vital life support of oneself or another 
that is evil and not the suffering of the act of being killed.  
Aquinas states that a woman “commits no sin in being violated 
by force, provided she does not consent, since without consent of 
the mind there is no stain on the body, as the Blessed Lucy 
declared,” and “it is evident that fornication and adultery are less 
grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life.”242  
Therefore, it is better to be killed than to kill; “[i]t belongs to 
fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, 
for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin.”243 
On the other hand, if the aggressor holds several people 
hostage and claims convincingly that he will kill all of them but 
will refrain if one of them surrenders himself to be killed by the 
aggressor, one is not obliged to surrender but it is permitted to 
sacrifice oneself out of charitable love in order to save the rest of 
the hostages.  To lay down one’s life for one’s friends is a 
supererogatory act that is the perfection of charity.  Saint 
Maximilian Kolbe did just this when he suffered a martyr’s death 
in the Nazi death camp of Auschwitz in 1941.244 
J. Case of the Trolley 
Trolleyology has presented a conundrum ever since it was 
first introduced by Philippa Foot in 1967.245  She considers the 
case of a trolley whose brakes have failed.246  It is heading toward 
five people who will not be able to get off the track in time.  There 
is a spur leading off to one side, but there is one person on it who 
will be killed if the driver turns the trolley onto the spur.  There 
 
241 Philippa Foot reaches the same conclusion in a similar case where a judge 
faces “rioters demanding that a culprit be found for a certain crime and threatening 
otherwise” to kill others. Id. at 7. The judge is in a position to execute an innocent 
person for the crime to prevent the others from being killed. Foot rejects this act, 
saying that “most of us would be appalled at the idea that the innocent man could be 
framed.” Id. Alison McIntyre remarks that this particular moral problem is not 
solved by the doctrine of double effect, but rather “[t]he contrast between what you 
foresee as a result of the agency of others and what you intend as a result of your 
own agency is doing all of the explanatory work here.” McIntyre, supra note 40, at 
232. 
242 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469. 
243 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 5, at 1470. 
244 For a biography of Saint Maxamilian Kolbe’s life see ELAINE MURRAY STONE, 
MAXIMILIAN KOLBE: SAINT OF AUSCHWITZ (1997). 
245 See Foot, supra note 40, at 7. 
246 Id. Foot also gives an example “in which a pilot whose aeroplane is about to 
crash is deciding whether to steer from a more to a less inhabited area.” Id. 
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is no other alternative.  Foot concludes that the driver should 
turn the trolley onto the spur and kill the one person instead of 
allowing the five to be killed.  Her justification is mainly 
intuitive.247  The case can be justified further by an analogy to 
Aquinas’s almsgiving case.  In the same way that a man who has 
“merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others 
under his charge,” throws “away his life and that of others if he 
were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him,”248 
the man throws away his life or the lives of others under his 
charge if he does not duck, block, or redirect a moving force that 
will kill himself or those others, even when that action results in 
the death of another who would not otherwise have died.  In this 
case, the driver of the trolley249 has a duty of due care to drive the 
trolley so that it does not harm others.  To use Aquinas’s words, 
these others are under his charge.  The duty extends not only to 
passengers on his trolley, but also to those outside the trolley, 
such as the five people on the main track and the one person on 
the spur who can be hurt by the trolley’s operation.  In this case, 
the driver cannot prevent the trolley from harming at least one 
person.  He must choose between the five and the one.  Aquinas 
 
247 Philippa Foot believes that one would “say, without hesitation, that the 
driver should steer for the less occupied track.” Id. Thomson describes Foot’s answer 
to this problem as one that characterizes the problem as “a conflict between a 
negative duty to refrain from killing five and a negative duty to refrain from killing 
one,” from which Foot concludes that “a negative duty to refrain from killing five is 
surely more stringent than a negative duty to refrain from killing one.” Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 MONIST 204, 206–
07 (1976) (citing Foot, supra note 40). In her 1976 article, Thomson disagrees with 
Foot that one must turn the trolley to kill only one and states that her intuition tells 
her “only that it is permissible for him to do so.” Id. at 207. In an article nine years 
later, while addressing the case of a bystander in control of the trolley, Thomson 
adds that the permissibility stems from the fact that he “does not merely minimize 
the number of deaths which get caused: He minimizes the number of deaths which 
get caused by something that already threatens people, and that will cause deaths 
whatever the bystander does.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 
YALE L.J. 1395, 1408 (1985). Thomson calls this “a ‘distributive exemption,’ which 
permits arranging that something that will do harm anyway shall be better 
distributed than it otherwise would be.” Id. Thomson points out that this exemption 
is the redirection of a lethal force and not the use of other lethal means to 
accomplish one’s purpose of saving the five. For example, one cannot throw a fat 
man onto the tracks to stop the trolley from killing the five at the cost of the life of 
the fat man. Id. at 1409. For further discussion of this problem, see DAVID 
EDMONDS, WOULD YOU KILL THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND WHAT 
YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG 35–43 (2014). 
248 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. 
249 The driver may be the designated driver or a bystander who assumes control 
when the designated driver is incapacitated. 
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would probably agree that, other things being equal, it is better 
to redirect the trolley to kill one rather than letting it kill five.250  
The killing of the one is not attributable to the driver because it 
is impossible for the driver to save everyone, and Aquinas states 
that “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins 
by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.”251 
If the trolley has no driver and is proceeding down the main 
track towards a person who is inescapably bound on the track 
and this person can reach a trolley switch to redirect the trolley 
to a spur where one or more other people are inescapably bound, 
things are not equal here because one’s own life is at stake.  The 
principle of self-protection derived from the passage252 permitting 
the retention of food as a necessary vital life support applies by 
analogy to permit the person on the main track to redirect the 
trolley to the spur to save himself from death, even though the 
person or persons on the spur will be killed as a result.253  On the 
other hand, if the person on the main track is not able to redirect 
the trolley, but can block it by causing another person to fall in 
front of the trolley with the foreseen result that the other person 
will die, the blocking act is prohibited because it does not merely 
block, but also attacks the integrity of the other person’s life. 
If the trolley has no driver and is proceeding down the main 
track towards a person who is inescapably bound to the track, 
and if another person, who is inescapably bound to the track on a 
spur, is able to reach a trolley switch to redirect the trolley to the 
spur, it is permissible for the person on the spur to do nothing.  
Yet it may be praiseworthy as an act of charitable love to redirect 
the trolley to the spur in self-sacrifice, much as when a soldier 
jumps on a grenade to save the lives of his comrades.  However, if 
the person on the spur is bound along with another person to 
that track, it is prohibited to redirect the trolley to the spur as an 
act of charitable love.  Although a person may lay down his life 
for his friends, Aquinas never indicates that he may lay down the 
life of another.  By redirecting the trolley, the person on the spur 
attacks the integrity of the other person’s life.  This would be 
 
250 When speaking of an injury that one causes to another, Aquinas states that 
“[o]ther things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects 
more persons.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 4, at 1475. 
251 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525. 
252 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328–29. 
253 This does not prevent the person from sacrificing himself in an act of 
charitable love. 
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true even if there were ten people bound on the main track and 
the person on the spur wants to further the common good by 
having the trolley kill fewer people, namely himself and the other 
person on the spur with him.  Aquinas states that if a private 
individual wants to do something for the common good but it “be 
harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the 
judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to 
be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole,” that is, a 
person with public authority.254  This situation is not analogous 
to the case of the trolley driver who directs the trolley to the spur 
with the fewer people on it.  The driver in that case has a duty of 
due care to all the people who could be harmed by the trolley and 
the redirection is an act of protection of those under his charge.  
The person bound to the track on the spur is not redirecting the 
trolley to protect those under his charge because he is not 
responsible for the people bound on the main track.255 
 
254 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1468. Alon 
Harel and Assaf Sharon reach the opposite conclusion. They believe that Aquinas 
can be interpreted to allow a private individual to kill an innocent person if the 
number to be saved is large enough. Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, ‘Necessity Knows 
No Law’: On Extreme Cases and Uncodifiable Necessities, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 845, 
853 (2011). Aquinas states that “if a case arise wherein the observance of that law 
would be injurious to the general welfare, it should not be observed . . . . [and if] the 
peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved in referring the matter to 
authority, the necessity itself carries with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no 
law.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 96, art. 6, at 798. In other 
words, according to Harel and Sharon, in cases of sudden emergency a private 
individual on his own authority may avoid observance of the law when it is hurtful 
to the general welfare, and, since the failure to rescue many lives at the cost of one 
innocent life is hurtful to the general welfare, it is permissible to save the many 
despite this cost. Harel & Sharon, supra, at 857–60. However, there is no indication 
in Aquinas that the failure by a private individual to rescue many lives at the cost of 
one innocent life is hurtful to the general welfare rather than promotes it. On the 
contrary, Aquinas does state that when a private individual acts for the common 
good, that individual may not harm another person. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra 
note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1468. Even an individual acting under public 
authority may not harm an innocent person. See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. A 
private individual acting on his own authority must not presume upon God’s 
authority over life and death; this presumption, which is evil in itself, exists even in 
a situation where the common good of saving lives is at stake. In support of the 
prohibition based on intuition, Thomson reverses an earlier position of hers and 
states that “A must let five die if saving them requires killing B.” Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, Turning the Trolley, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.  359, 367 (2008). But see 
William J. FitzPatrick, Thomson’s Turnabout on the Trolley, 69 ANALYSIS 636, 636–
43 (2009) (opposing Thomson’s reasoning). 
255 An interesting question to consider is whether Aquinas would accept the idea 
that the person on the spur could act like a bystander who has taken over the 
direction of the trolley in the absence of the driver by controlling the train switch.  If 
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CONCLUSION 
This study of Aquinas’s texts on acts resulting in death has 
been directed to understanding which are prohibited and which 
are permitted in one extreme situation—when a person (whether 
oneself or another) is certain to die if nothing is done and the 
only way to save that person is by one’s act (as a private 
individual and not one acting under public authority) knowing 
that it must result in the certain killing of some other person.  
Based on an analysis of Aquinas’s use of the term intention to 
include foreseen deaths, it rejects the doctrine of double effect as 
an interpretation of Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense,256 as 
well as the conclusion from this doctrine that Aquinas permits 
killing in self-defense that attacks another’s vital life support 
when there is no other alternative to save oneself.  Instead it 
argues that Aquinas prohibits any act by a private individual to 
save a person (whether oneself or another) knowing that it must 
result in the certain killing of some other person, unless one 
retains or removes from the person killed a vital life support 
belonging to the person saved, or unless one ducks, blocks, or 
redirects a deadly force away from the person saved (whether 
oneself or another who is under one’s charge). 
Few people have accepted such a strict interpretation of 
Aquinas’s prohibition against killing.  Yet the prohibition is 
inherent in Aquinas’s understanding of humankind’s relation to 
God.  God retains authority over the life and death of a human 
person because He made humankind in His own image enabling 
humankind to become sons of God.  Therefore, in every person, 
including aggressors, we ought to love the God-like nature which 
God has made.  Those who understand this relationship between 
humankind and God and have prohibited all killing by a private 
individual include a number of the early Church Fathers, 
Mahatma Ghandi, Dorothy Day, and Leo Tolstoy. 
On the other hand, Aquinas permits certain acts that result 
in the death of another person because he allows a person to 
protect herself with her own resources.  A review of the extant 
literature shows no discussion that develops this idea on the 
 
so, then an argument can be made for the person on the spur that he is protecting 
the people threatened by the deadly force as people under his assumed charge and 
that his directing the trolley towards himself and the other person on the spur is a 
permitted act as choosing the lesser harm when the avoidance of all harm is 
impossible. 
256 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. 
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basis of the passage concerning self-support in a case of 
urgency.257  Yet by this passage, Aquinas permits one to retain or 
remove from another a vital life support belonging to oneself or 
those one is saving if it is the only way to save, and by an analogy 
to this text Aquinas permits one to duck, block, or redirect a 
deadly force away from oneself or those under one’s charge if it is 
the only way to save.  There are times when one transfers one’s 
vital life support to another by taking on a duty to protect that 
other with one’s life, although Aquinas is not always clear as to 
when that duty exists.  In such a case one must be prepared to 
lay down one’s life for the other.  On the other hand, although no 
duty exists to sacrifice oneself in charitable love to save another, 
such an act is praiseworthy as reaching to the perfection of love 
of God. 
Aquinas’s prohibition against killing and his permission of 
certain acts that result in the death of another are applicable to 
several modern-day controversial cases, even though Aquinas did 
not have occasion to consider them.  For example, a craniotomy 
and radiation therapy, which kill a fetus, are prohibited killings, 
whereas a salpingectomy and a hysterectomy are not, although 
there is some question in the latter case dependent on Aquinas’s 
understanding of the duty of the mother.  A conjoined twin or 
anyone attached to a person’s body can be removed from that 
person’s body to save the person’s life, although it may be 
difficult to determine who is attached to whom in the former 
case.  People who share a vital life support such as a boat may 
agree to a fair way to allocate ownership of the support of the 
boat in a case where the boat will not support everyone, but in a 
case where such agreement is not possible, such as two mountain 
climbers on a rope, the only way to save one of them depends on 
the other’s willingness to sacrifice himself before the stay gives 
way.  One may duck, block, or redirect an oncoming deadly force 
to avoid it even if another will die as a result, but one may not 
use another to block the deadly force nor initiate a force deadly to 
another to escape it. 
Hopefully, from this analysis, the reader may appreciate that 
Saint Thomas Aquinas provides a deeper meaning to the value of 
human life by considering it in relation to its Creator and Savior.  
He challenges each of us to raise our thoughts to Him who 
lovingly shows us the way to our ultimate fulfillment. 
 
257  Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328–29. 
